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Abstract:  
 
This paper reviews the recent economic literature on issues of health and nutrition with a 
special focus on obesity. Statistics show substantial variation in obesity rates both across 
countries and along socio-economic lines within countries indicating a need for a greater 
engagement by social sciences and economics. Various economic models emphasise 
different aspects of consumer behaviour related to obesity. The neoclassical approach 
stresses that overweight and obesity can be the outcome of rational decision making as a 
result of changes in relative prices. Household production theory adds components of 
education, abilities and time allocation and models of intertemporal choice assume a 
dynamic perspective. The field of behavioural economics points to deviations from rational 
behaviour that commonly occur in eating decisions. Potential market failures discussed as 
rationales for policy interventions are externalities, lack of information, and irrational 
behaviour. However, the empirical basis for the existence of these market failures is rather 
weak as is the empirical evidence on effectiveness and efficiency of specific policies such as 
fat taxes.  
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1 Introduction 
Almost one and a half decades ago the first papers dealing with economic aspects of obesity 
appeared in literature. They were both reactions to claims from the public health sector for 
financial measures to combat obesity as well as fundamental papers that set out the 
importance of economic research related to the topic (PHILIPSON, 2001). These articles 
inspired numerous economists to engage in research on obesity. A new branch titled as 
“Obesity Economics” emerged with an increasing output from year to year. The rise of this 
area is mirrored by the growing publications and papers over the years depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Number of economic publications on obesity (EconLit), 1998-2012 
 
Notes:  The number of publications in each year refers to the results of an EconLit-search for the keywords 
“Overweight”, “Obese”, and “Obesity”. 
Source:  Own composition inspired by CAWLEY (2011).  
 
What is fascinating about “Obesity Economics” is the broadness of its contributions that 
enhance the general scientific and public discussion on the drivers of the global obesity 
epidemic and possible solutions to it. On a theoretical basis, economists stress that 
overweight or obesity can be a rational choice that maximises individual utility. At the same 
time they investigate possible deviations from rational behaviour or the existence of market 
failures that lead to welfare-decreasing outcomes. On the empirical side a strong focus lies 
on the investigation of causal relationships between economic and environmental factors, 
human behaviour and health outcomes. The instruments of modern econometrics and the 
increasing availability of large household data sets provide the basis for important insights 
into the structural pathways.  
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The objective of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the economic literature related 
to obesity. The structure of this review is as follows. Section 2 presents some stylised facts 
characterising the development and the current structure of obesity across and within 
countries. Section 3 sketches the basic theory and the various extensions established by 
economists to explain the patterns shown by the data. These theories provide the basis for 
the discussion about the appropriateness of government interventions in Section 4. 
Section 5 is devoted to the special case of fiscal measures aimed at reducing obesity and 
presents theoretical considerations and empirical evidence about the effect of food prices 
on body weight and obesity prevalence. A concluding discussion highlights some avenues for 
further research. 
2 Stylised facts on structure and development of obesity 
This section provides some stylised facts about the development of obesity and its 
distribution across countries and within populations. The observed patterns – especially the 
gradients along variables such as income, education or gender – clearly point to an 
important role of socioeconomic factors in the determination of obesity. Hence, an 
engagement of social sciences is necessary to explain trends and variation in the data that 
cannot be explained by genes or environmental toxins alone. However, prior to a closer look 
at the statistics, it deems appropriate to elaborate on the basic indicators of overweight and 
obesity in more detail.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines overweight and obesity as “abnormal or 
excessive fat accumulation that may impair health” (WHO, 2012). The most common 
indicator of excess body weight and fat is the Body Mass Index (BMI). It is calculated as an 
individual’s weight in kg divided by its height squared in m². According to the WHO 
classification, a person is overweight, when her BMI is greater than or equal to 25. At a BMI 
greater than or equal to 30, she will be classified as obese.  
However, the use of BMI as a measure of fatness is not free from critique (see, e.g. 
BURKHAUSER and CAWLEY, 2008). Firstly, the cut-off values that define overweight and obesity 
are often claimed to be set arbitrarily. Secondly, BMI should be considered “a rough guide” 
(WHO, 2012), because two persons that have the same BMI may have a completely different 
level or distribution of body fat. Despite these drawbacks, BMI refers to the easily 
measurable anthropometric variables height and weight and is widely available for many 
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countries and over time. Hence, it is useful for epidemiological research but it may not be 
appropriate in the individual case (SASSI, 2010). In any case, the general patterns of rising 
obesity rates across and within countries and over time are highly relevant and pose 
interesting questions to (economic) research.  
Patterns of overweight and obesity across countries 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of adult populations that is overweight (including the obese) 
and obese for OECD countries as well as selected non-OECD countries. As revealed by the 
left panel, a considerable proportion (and often the majority) of people have a BMI larger 
than 25 in many countries. In the whole OECD, about one half of all people are overweight, 
while in the USA and Mexico more than two thirds are overweight. The Asian members, 
Korea and Japan, exhibit the lowest rates. Here, one third or less are overweight and obese.  
However, overweight and obesity are not an exclusive problem of developed countries. 
Transition and developing countries show high prevalence of people with excess weight, too. 
In South Africa, the Russian Federation, and Brazil the proportion is around 50 %. 
Furthermore, the left panel indicates that overweight is more pronounced among men 
compared to women. 
The figures for the obesity rates in the right panel show an almost identical ranking for the 
different countries, however, the cross-county differences are more pronounced. Whereas 
the USA have an about 2.5 times higher overweight prevalence than Japan the ratio is larger 
than ten with respect to the proportion of obese people. Remarkably, the gap between men 
and women that is present on the left-hand side disappears or is reversed in some countries 
when looking at the right-hand side.  
Figure 3 illustrates the development of obesity over time in selected countries. Although all 
countries experience rising rates of obesity there is substantial variation in the pace of this 
growth as well as in the initial and current levels. The gap between countries has widened 
over time with the USA consolidating its position as the country with by far the globally 
highest rates of obesity (SASSI, 2010). Additionally, the figure points out a fundamental 
obstacle to obesity research: for most countries except the US, robust data on measures of 
overweight and obesity do not go back further than the mid-1980s.  
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Figure 2: Overweight and obesity rates in OECD and selected non-OECD countries 
Overweight (BMI≥25)  Obesity (BMI≥30) 
 
 
Note: For Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom and 
United States, rates are based on measured, rather than self-reported, body mass index (BMI). 
(*) The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the 
OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of 
international law. 
Source:  SASSI (2010) based on OECD Health Data 2010, and WHO Infobase for Brazil, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Russian Federation and South Africa.  
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Figure 3: Prevalence of obesity over time for selected countries 
 
Source: OECD (2012). 
MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) discuss possible reasons for the considerable variation in obesity 
rates across OECD countries. Higher obesity prevalence occurs in societies where 
“individualism” and “reliance on free markets” (like the US or Great Britain) is important 
compared to countries where “community involvement and regulation” are more strongly 
accepted (like in Japan, Korea, and Scandinavia)(ibid., p.14). A second aspect put forward by 
MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) is that countries with a “strong food tradition” like France, Italy, 
Korea, or Japan, where “fewer dietary adjustments” have been made, show less obese 
populations. ALSTON et al. (2008) assess whether differences in agricultural policies can 
explain some of the cross-country variation but do not find a clear pattern. Generally, in the 
presence of multiple possible confounders, such an analysis stays at a more or less 
speculative level. A closer look at the patterns and dynamics within populations seems more 
promising, especially, when large and informative data sets are at hand. For the study of 
obesity and the design of policies, it is also important whether weight gain is a phenomenon 
that concerns the whole population or whether there are subgroups that are particularly 
affected. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
P
re
va
le
n
ce
 o
f 
o
b
es
it
y
USA
England
Spain
France
Canada
Korea
Italy
Switzerland
Ireland
Hungary
 7 
 
Within-country distribution of body weights 
A closer look at micro data reveals that body weights do not shift uniformly within 
populations. Long-term time series document a general increase in average height-adjusted 
body weights during the whole 20th century (COSTA and STECKEL, 1995). Recently, the extreme 
weights at the right tail of the distribution show dynamics, in particular (PHILIPSON, 2001). 
Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of BMI for males and females in the USA and how 
they have changed over time.  
Figure 4: Distribution of BMI in the US population, 1971-1975 and 1988-1994 
Males, age 20-55 Females, age 20-55 
 
Source: CUTLER et al. (2003) based on NHANES-Data. 
Obviously, some population groups have put on more weight than others. Otherwise the 
curve would not have changed its shape but would just have shifted to the right. The right 
tails are more strongly pronounced today than in the past indicating that the weights of 
susceptible groups and thus the percentage of obese individuals have risen much more 
sharply than the weight of the average person (MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009). Based on data from 
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), CHOU et al. (2004) report 
that between 1978 and 1991 the percentage of obese people in the US rose by over one half 
from 14 % to 22 %. In the same period, the mean BMI rose by 1.24 kg/m² which is only an 
increase by 5 %. Similar patterns can be found in other industrialised countries like England 
(see Figure A1 in the appendix) and to a lower degree also for transition countries like Russia 
(see Figure A2 in the appendix). 
Statistics that link obesity to socio-demographic variables strengthen the picture of obesity 
as a phenomenon that varies strongly across population subgroups. Thereby, both levels as 
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well as growth rates are subject to substantial heterogeneity. SASSI (2010) provides evidence 
on the social disparities of obesity prevalence that exist along age, socio-economic status 
(education, income), gender, and ethnicity. Again, higher obesity rates can be observed for 
women in most countries but pre-obesity (i.e. overweight) is much more common in men. 
Nevertheless, obesity is growing faster among males. Age and BMI show an inverse U-
shaped relationship: BMI increases with age up to a certain level and then declines again 
slightly. Although the decline at higher ages could be explained by a loss of muscle tissue and 
general degradation processes (see e.g. ELMADFA and LEITZMANN, 2004, p.496), this finding 
should be interpreted with care. Cohort effects as well as higher mortality of obese people 
could also be possible reasons.  
Figure 5: Disparities in obesity in consideration of educational level, selected OECD countries 
 
Source: SASSI (2010). 
Obesity rates differ considerably for groups with different educational levels, too. Figure 5 
depicts calculations of a relative index of inequality that show the relative probability to be 
obese for persons with the lowest education compared to the highest educated group 
(OECD, 2012). Better educated individuals are less often obese than persons with lower 
education. The spread in obesity prevalence between both groups varies across gender and 
different countries. For men, educational differences are less pronounced than for women. 
The left panel of Figure 5 shows factors around three at the maximum and an index of equal 
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to or smaller than one for the United States and Korea (indicating that the higher educated 
that are equally or even more obese) for males. For women, the differences are huge. In 
Spain and Korea the least educated women are 18.4 times, respective, 16.9 times more likely 
to be obese compared to the highest educated. The ratios for income or social class, 
depicted in Figure 6, are less pronounced than for education but show a similar pattern. 
Figure 6: Disparities in obesity in consideration of household income or occupation - based social class, 
selected OECD countries 
 
Source: SASSI (2010). 
While an analysis of the OECD found that the social disparities “remained remarkably stable 
over time” (SASSI, 2010), CUTLER et al. (2003) draw a more complex picture. They present data 
on the BMI and obesity prevalence in the US across population groups for 1971-75 and 1988-
94 (see Table 1). Many subgroups have different levels of obesity with the case of education 
being particularly interesting. For the period 1971-75 there is a strong gradient for women 
with 24 % obese in the lowest educated group and only 7 % obese in the highest educated. 
Similarly, 15 % of the lowest educated men are obese and only 8 % in the highest educated 
group. Over time, the absolute differences for women have almost prevailed. Only the 
medium group experienced a higher increase of 20 % (versus 13 % to 14 % in the higher and 
lower groups). In contrast, the figures for men have nearly converged over time implying 
that the growth rates for the better educated (college or more) were considerably higher 
than for the lower educated.  
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Table 1: Weight increase in different population groups, USA, 1971-1994 
 
 Average BMI (kg/m²) 
 
 Percentage Obese (BMI ≥ 30) 
    
 1971-75 
 
1988-94  1971-75 1988-94 
Average 25.4 27.3  16 30 
Adults      
All 25.0 27.1  15 28 
Single male 24.4 25.5  9 18 
Married male, nonworking spouse 25.6 27.1  13 26 
Married male, working spouse 25.7 27.3  11 24 
Single female 24.9 27.4  18 32 
Married female, working 24.3 27.4  13 33 
Married female, not working 24.9 28.0  16 36 
Elderly      
All 26.1 27.6  19 32 
Male 25.4 27.0  13 28 
Female 26.7 25.4  25 36 
Women aged 20+, by education group      
<High school 26.3 28.4  24 28 
High School 24.2 27.5  13 33 
College or more 22.8 25.4  7 20 
Men aged 20+, by education group      
<High school 25.6 26.5  15 23 
High School 25.7 26.7  13 24 
College or more 25.2 26.4  8 21 
Notes:  Data are from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES); the BMI is measured 
in kg/m². 
Source: CUTLER et al. (2003).  
Figure 7: Obesity and overweight in different ethnic groups in England (adults) 
 
Source: SASSI (2010), OECD analysis of Health Survey for England (HSE) data 1995-2007. 
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Disparities across ethnic groups are shown for England and the USA in Figures 7 and 8. In 
both countries, white men show the highest prevalence of obesity and overweight. Among 
females, it is the Black and Mexican American groups that have the highest rates. These 
differences prevail even after accounting for possible socio-economic correlates (SASSI, 
2010). However, the BMI thresholds that define obesity in white/Caucasian men and women 
may not apply equally well to other ethnicities. 
Figure 8: Obesity and overweight in different ethnic groups in the United States (adults) 
 
Source: SASSI (2010), OECD analysis of National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) data 
1999-2008. 
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3 Economic approaches to explain increasing obesity rates 
Around the year 2000, economists took up the issue of rising obesity rates and set out an 
“economic research agenda” to identify determinants and possible avenues to address it 
(PHILIPSON, 2001). As the guiding principle, economists perceive the determination of body 
weight as the outcome of multiple individual choices. All decisions people make about what 
and how much to eat and drink or how active to be in their leisure time or at their working 
place affect their energy balance and, thus, their body weight. The numerous economic 
contributions presented below deal with the question whether these choices and obesity as 
a possible outcome are to be regarded as the result of rational decisions, irrational 
behaviour, or something in between. 
In this regard, economists do not get tired of pointing out that the optimal body weight from 
an economic point of view may well differ from the optimal one proposed by medicines and 
public health specialists. Whereas the former is characterised as the state where the 
underlying behaviours maximise utility subject to the restrictions people face, the latter is 
concerned with the strict maximisation of health. 
Given the shifts in obesity and overweight over time and between populations as sketched in 
Section 2, the natural reaction of economists is to look which conditions and incentives have 
changed that led people to alter their optimal behaviour in a weight-increasing way. The 
following review will first present the benchmark scenario of a rational individual that 
decides freely and autonomously on his or her body weight under given restrictions. Later 
on, possible deviations and irrationalities will find their way into the discussion. 
3.1 Neoclassical interpretation: Technological change and shifts in relative prices 
Researchers from a branch termed as “neoclassical theory of obesity” (PHILIPSON and POSNER, 
2008, p.975) see welfare-enhancing technological change as the primary reason for the long-
term increase in overweight and obesity within the last 150 years. Accordingly, both supply 
and demand side changes have contributed to increasing costs of physical activity and to 
decreasing costs of energy intake (LAKDAWALLA and PHILIPSON, 2009). Innovations in agriculture 
and food processing lowered the price of food while technological progress made work on 
the job and in the household less strenuous and energy-demanding. While workers in former 
societies “were paid to exercise”, people are now considered to “pay to exercise” 
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(LAKDAWALLA et al., 2005, p.253), firstly in a direct way by, for instance, joining fitness clubs 
but also indirectly by investing their leisure time in physical activities. Additionally, modern 
entertainment technologies lowered the prices for sedentary leisure activities. 
The proponents of the neoclassical view credit their interpretation to do “surprisingly well in 
explaining the observed trends” (LAKDAWALLA et al., 2005, p.253). By means of a simple 
model, they offer some interesting implications on offsetting effects of price changes for 
calorie intake and expenditure and the relationship of income and body weight. A more 
detailed presentation of the basic model below will illustrate both the unique contributions 
that economics provides to the analysis of obesity but also some weaknesses that arise from 
too-strict mathematical economic models. 
As a basic feature of the neoclassical model of obesity, body weight W enters the utility 
function besides food intake F and alternative consumption C (PHILIPSON and POSNER, 1999): 
(1) C)F,S),U(W(F,U   
 
Body weight, in turn, increases with energy intake from food F and decreases with strenuous 
energy expenditure S. For a growth in weight, F needs to exceed S. Furthermore, the 
marginal effects of F and S diminish with rising levels (i.e. 0F²²W   and 0S²²W  ). 
Also F and S are complementary, i.e. when an individual spends more energy the effect of 
energy intake gains in importance ( 0SF²W  ) (PHILIPSON and POSNER, 1999). 
The crucial assumption of eq. (1) is that weight affects utility in a non-monotonic way. 
PHILIPSON and POSNER (1999) argue that every person has an ideal weight W0 that may be 
either determined by ‘objective’ medical guidelines or subjective social norms or personal 
aesthetic values. Deviations from W0 decrease utility at an increasing rate (i.e. 
0)WWU( 0   and 0²)WWU( 0 ² ).  
The main claim of economics in this context is that “neither subjective nor any objective 
weight W0 is the preferred weight in the economic sense” (PHILIPSON and POSNER, 1999, p.8). 
To see this, consider the maximisation of U subject to an income constraint where the level 
of physical activity S is exogenously given: 
(2) IpFC        s.t.         C)F,S),U(W(F,Umax    , 
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where p is the price of energy from food and I is income. The first-order conditions of 
maximisation lead to: 
 
(3) p
C
U
F
U
F
W
W
U










 
 
In the optimum, the ratio of the marginal utility of food intake (that occurs directly via “joy 
of eating” and indirectly via the weight effect) and the marginal utility of alternative 
consumption have to equal the price ratio (where the alternative price is the numeraire). 
Alternatively, equation (3’) illustrates the trade-offs that emerge between weight, food and 
other consumption.  
(3’) 
C
U
p
F
U
F
W
W
U










. 
 
The relevant relationships are shown in Figure 9 that plots energy intake against the 
marginal benefits and costs from it. For a given S, the indirect marginal benefit of food via 
weight   FWWU  is positive as long as a person is below her ideal weight (W0) and 
gets negative when her weight exceeds W0. While food intake F0 would maximise utility 
derived just by weight, the total marginal benefit of food intake )())(( FUFWWU   
is larger since utility increases with food intake. Thus, a person’s optimal level of food 
consumption lies at F* where the total marginal benefit of food intake equals marginal costs 
of food consumption )( CUp   that arise from the foregone consumption of alternative 
goods. This point also determines the optimal weight W* that may or may not differ from 
W0. How strong both weight points differ from each other depends on the food prices and 
the marginal utilities of food consumption, of deviation from ideal body weight, and of 
alternative consumption.  
An increase (a decrease) in the price of food energy shifts )( CUp   to the left (to the right) 
and causes body weight to decline (to rise), i.e. 0)(  pW . Also an increase in income 
would cause a rightward shift and higher body weight (i.e. 0)(  IW ). Moreover, the more 
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important other consumption C is to a person, the steeper is )( CUp   which lowers body 
weight, too. A further important aspect is the marginal utility of direct food consumption. 
The larger )( FU   the higher is the optimal body weight.1  
Figure 9: Ideal, optimal, and maximum weight 
 
 
Source: PHILIPSON and POSNER (1999). 
Finally, PHILIPSON and POSNER (1999) emphasize that the model predicts the rise in body 
weight to be “self-containing”. When the price of food energy approaches zero or income 
gains go to infinity food intake reaches an upper limit FM. Here, the negative impact of 
weighing much more than W0 would compensate the positive utility from eating. 
PHILIPSON and POSNER (1999) as well as other authors provide further extensions and 
implications of the neoclassical model. LAKDAWALLA and PHILIPSON (2002; 2009) provide a 
dynamic version of the neoclassical theory. Additional features, for example non-monotonic 
effects of income, emerge from assuming that health is a normal good or as PHILIPSON and 
POSNER (1999) put it: “Wealthier or educated individuals care more about their weight for 
                                                 
1
 However, this is not a sufficient condition for a higher deviation of W* from W0. At low incomes or very high 
food prices, that is, when the optimal body weight may be to the left of the ideal body weight, W* and W0 may be 
even more closely to each other. 
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health or other reasons, and so they limit their weight more” (p.12). The result, an inverted 
U-shaped relationship of income and weight, matches the observation that weight rises with 
income in poorer countries whereas it declines with higher incomes in richer nations. 
However, it is likely that many factors correlated to income explain large parts of its weight 
effect. The work of SCHMEISER (2009) for instance shows that the negative effect of income on 
weight, which is especially pronounced for women, turns positive once the variation in 
income is controlled by instrumental variables. Thus, exogenous increases in income cause 
body weights to rise in wealthy countries, too. Among the factors that are linked to income 
(and certainly mask its positive effect) are education, motivation, abilities, but also social 
norms and competition for appearance that people in better-paying jobs have to face. Some 
of these effects will be discussed in the following sections. 
Energy expenditure as endogenous choice 
The model is also extended by introducing strenuousness S as a choice variable which acts 
through its impacts on weight and income. PHILIPSON and POSNER see a shift in the effect on 
income I(S) as crucial for the rise in obesity. They argue that in agrarian societies physical 
effort has raised income (i.e. 0 SI ), whereas in post-industrial societies physical effort 
lowers income ( 0 SI ) and causes weight to rise. A further extension of the model would 
be to introduce recreational exercise E, that may mirror the jogging and gym “revolution” 
which is likely to offset the effects of less strenuous work at the job (PHILIPSON and POSNER, 
1999, pp.16). PHILIPSON and POSNER (2008) regard this complementarity of energy intake and 
energy expenditure as the reason for the observed steady growth in body weight despite 
periods of falling energy consumption in the 20th century.  
The framework of PHILIPSON and POSNER is more applicable to the general increase of weight 
observed over the last 100 years. However, the recent changes in the shape of the BMI 
distribution are the results of the likely interaction of declining food prices and increases in 
wealth with many other factors. Models based on the household production theory point to 
aspects of reduced time costs in cooking, increased labour force participation of women, or 
changes in skills and abilities connected to nutrition and food preparation. Alternatively, 
behavioural economics stress the role that exogenous cues and decision heuristics play in a 
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changing food environment and emphasise irrational behaviours such as time 
inconsistencies. The next section discusses these arguments in more detail. 
3.2 Household production theory 
3.2.1 Basic concept 
A very important stream of the economic literature on obesity relies on the household 
production theory that originates from BECKER (1965). This framework allows researchers to 
include the time that consumers have at their disposal as well as their knowledge and their 
abilities into the economic analysis of behaviour. 
BECKER (1965) enhanced the neoclassic consumer theory by the notion that it is not the 
market goods which generate a person’s utility in the first place but rather more elementary 
commodities, also called Z-goods (eq. 4). Examples of such Z-goods are health, love, or 
prestige. 
(4) ),...,( 1 nZZuU  . 
Household production theory treats households as small factories that produce these 
elementary commodities by combining market goods xi and their non-market time ti, as 
depicted in equation (5). The vector E describes the „state of the art of production” or the 
„level of technology of the production process” (MICHAEL and BECKER, 1973). It includes 
households’ assets, their knowledge, and their abilities.  
(5) );,( EtxfZ iiii  . 
Hence, households are producers and maximise their utility at the same time. Consumers’ 
demand for market goods is thus a derived demand analogous to a firm’s demand for 
production factors (MICHAEL and BECKER, 1973). 
A third innovation of household production theory is the extension of the narrow budget 
constraint in the conventional framework to a “full-income constraint”. By allowing time to 
be freely convertible between direct use and income generation, the final restriction of the 
Becker model is the total time available (T).  
(6)  
i
iii xpwtVwTS )( . 
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Equation (6) shows the composition of a household’s full income S. It can be described as the 
monetary value of T at the (constant) wage rate w plus non-labour income V. The income 
that is spent on each elementary commodity Zi consists of the opportunity cost of time 
necessary for its production ( iwt ) plus the value of the market goods that are used ( ii xp ) 
(BECKER, 1965). 
When households maximise their utility with respect to the full-income constraint and their 
production functions, they reach the following equilibrium: 
(7) 
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The ratio of the marginal utilities, MUi and MUj, of two commodities Zi and Zj, must be equal 
to the ratio of their marginal costs, πi and πj. The marginal costs (i.e., dC/dZi) are the shadow 
prices of the Z-goods that depend on the wage rate w, the price vectors pi and pj of the 
market goods as well as the input-output relations of time and goods present in the 
production of the commodities (BECKER, 1965). 
This framework allows the restrictions of human behaviour to be modelled more explicitly. It 
emphasises more general goals of households and separates the preferences for these from 
restrictions of time, knowledge and abilities, as well as the state of the consumption 
environment (MICHAEL and BECKER, 1973; POLLAK and WACHTER, 1975; SEEL, 2006).  
GROSSMAN (1972) established the application of household production theory to health 
research. He considered health as an investment good that depreciates over time but can be 
recovered through health production processes. The concept of health capital is a basic 
concept in the field of health economics (see e.g. LEIBOWITZ, 2004; GROSSMAN, 1972). At the 
same time the development literature used it to analyse hunger and malnutrition in 
developing countries (STRAUSS and THOMAS, 1998). Also the emerging field of obesity 
economics has increasingly applied household production theory to research on 
overnutrition and body weight. The next section presents a concise overview of the aspects 
that have been discussed in that area.  
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3.2.2 Applications in literature 
The literature that uses household production theory as a framework for analysing nutrition 
and obesity emphasises four main aspects. These are, analogous to the extensions of the 
theory, a) market-goods inputs and b) time inputs in the production of health as well as 
c) productivity issues related to education or knowledge. A final point is d) the structure and 
relation of different variables within the process of modelling and empirical analysis. 
CUTLER et al. (2003) see the main contribution of technological change to rising obesity in 
that it reduced the time costs of food preparation. This could especially explain the stronger 
shift at the right tail of the distribution, whereas the theory of PHILIPSON and POSNER (1999) is 
more applicable to the general increase in weight that occurred over the last hundred years. 
According to CUTLER et al., the time that women spend on preparing food and cleaning up 
after meals decreased by about 50 % between 1965 and 1995 (p.106). A further indication in 
favour of this view is that the growth of energy intake from 1977/8 to 1994/6, of men by 268 
kcal and of women by 143 kcal, can be attributed in large parts to additional snacking. The 
share of additional energy intake attributable to snacks is 90 % for men and 112 % for 
women. Hence, the rise in food consumption was mainly driven by the number of meals 
rather than the energy intake per meal. 
CHOU et al. (2004) focus on the effects that the availability of fast-food and full-service 
restaurants have on BMI and the prevalence of obesity. They argue that the rising number of 
such outlets dramatically reduced search and travel costs. Moreover, their analysis includes 
prices of meals in different types of restaurants and for food that is consumed at home, as 
well as prices for cigarettes and alcohol. These products are considered as inputs into the 
production of meals and health. The study of POWELL (2009) investigates the impact of fast-
food prices and fast-food availability on adolescent BMI. Fast-food, other food items and 
time inputs are regarded as inputs into health production as well as a direct source of utility.  
DRESCHER et al. (2009) examine the demand for healthy eating considering diversity of the 
consumed food products. Their innovative idea is that the combination of food inputs in the 
production of health, expressed as “healthy food diversity”, is an important aspect. HUFFMAN 
et al. (2010) analyse the impact of food prices on the aggregate demand for calories and the 
supply of health. They employ a broad range of variables, like prices for food and non-food, 
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as well as of time. Additionally, they include indicators for education, the child dependency 
ratio, labour force participation, and for the performance of public health systems. 
HAMERMESH (2007) assesses how the relation of time and goods inputs into the commodity 
“eating” has been affected by income and time prices over time. He finds increasing goods 
intensity, where both goods and time inputs increased with income but higher time prices 
reduced time inputs. FERTIG et al. (2009) investigate how maternal employment affects 
childhood obesity. They find small positive effects of mothers’ time inputs into the 
production of child health (like cooking or leisure time spent together). HAMERMESH (2009) 
examines the time spent on grazing (i.e. eating or drinking while pursuing another activity) in 
relation to the time that is spent on eating and drinking as the primary activity. He shows 
that the time spent on both is nearly equal, and that increasing wage rates imply increasing 
grazing.  
NAYGA (2000) contributes to a better understanding of the role that education plays in the 
health production process. He finds that the effects of schooling on weight and risk of 
obesity are mediated by health knowledge that raises the allocative efficiency of health 
production. The study of VARIYAM et al. (1999) emphasises the potential endogeneity of 
health information variables assumed to impact productivity of health production. They 
reject the exogeneity of such variables statistically in most cases. 
BEHRMAN and DEOLALIKAR (1988) and CHEN et al. (2002) contributed to structural issues related 
to household production of health. BEHRMAN and DEOLALIKAR present a comprehensive 
discussion of possibly endogenous and likely exogenous variables within a health production 
framework. CHEN et al. stress that variables collected in large-scale medical surveys like 
nutritional intakes are choice variables and, thus, endogenous. To receive unbiased 
estimates of their effect on health indicators, they should be instrumented by exogenous 
variables like prices of food and drugs.  
3.3 Intertemporal choice 
A growing number of authors examine the role that time preferences play in relation to the 
rise in obesity. The concept of time preferences refers to “decisions involving tradeoffs 
among costs and benefits occurring at different times” (FREDERICK et al., 2002, p.351). 
Intertemporal choice is not only important for questions such as how much money to save 
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today to be able to spend it tomorrow but also for the trade-off between the benefits of 
eating today and the costs of overweight and lower health in the future.  
The analysis of intertemporal choice in traditional economics is based on the discounted 
utility model by SAMUELSON (1937)2. The central parameter in this model is the discount rate 
that is considered to represent “all of the disparate motives underlying intertemporal 
choice” (FREDERICK et al., 2002, p.351). A discrete version of a person’s intertemporal utility 
function is shown by equation (8): 
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Equation (8) can be interpreted as the utility a person derives from consumption at time t+k 
and D(k) as her discount function that shows how she weighs the utility gained in every 
period. The discount rate ρ “represents the individual’s pure rate of time preference […] 
which is meant to reflect the collective effects of the ‘psychological’ motives” (FREDERICK et 
al., 2002, p.355) for the choice over time. Utility over a continuous time spectrum is 
expressed by equation (9): 
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The concept of intertemporal choice was adapted to the economics of health by GROSSMAN 
(1972) who analysed investments in health capital over an individual’s life time. In his model, 
a households’ utility function includes the commodity “health” which is produced by the 
households themselves.  
The literature discusses several ways by which heterogeneous intertemporal choice 
behaviour has played a role in the rise of obesity. KOMLOS et al. (2004) argue for instance that 
individuals have become more impatient over time, i.e. the rate of time preference has 
increased. They propose a model where people’s food consumption in each period provides 
                                                 
2
 FREDERICK et al. (2002, p.351) report that SAMUELSON had „manifest reservations about the normative and 
descriptive validity of the formulation”, however, “the discounted utility model was accepted almost instantly”. 
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immediate gratification whereas the benefits from investments in health affect utility in later 
periods. Hence, “as a population’s rate of time preferences rises, so will expenditure on non-
health-related consumption, whereas expenditure on health investments [including 
investments in a healthier weight] decreases” (ibid., p.212). To support their hypothesis, 
they provide some descriptive statistics relating obesity rates to saving rates over time and 
across countries showing some correlations. However, the authors admit that this evidence 
based on “simple proxies” is not strong enough to establish causal relationships.  
COURTEMANCHE et al. (2011, p.4) provide a short review of studies that do not support the 
hypothesis of a systematical change of time preferences in the course of time. ZHANG and 
RASHAD (2008) find a statistically significant relationship of BMI and time preference 
expressed by “willpower to lose weight”. However, their analysis is cross-sectional and the 
proxy that is used may be confounded with many other variables. 
COURTEMANCHE et al. (2011) discuss a second way how time preferences could have 
influenced obesity prevalence. They take up the perception of lower food prices as a main 
driver of weight gain and augment it with the notion of a heterogeneous discount rate 
across the population. Since food prices affect the costs occurring in the present, those 
individuals with higher discount rates (i.e. for which the present has a relatively higher value) 
are expected to react more strongly to falling food prices and gain more weight. Such an 
effect could explain why especially the right tails of the BMI distribution have expanded 
overproportionally (see Section 2).  
So far, these arguments do not contradict the neoclassical notion of rational reactions to 
changing economic incentives. The only difference is that people also shift consumption 
patterns over time. Many authors, however, claim that preferences over time are not fully 
consistent and preference relations change over time. Imagine a person thinking today 
about what to eat tomorrow. She may be not quite happy with her weight and decides to 
eat some salad, because she feels that she must do something for her health. When 
tomorrow then arrives and she actually has to choose what to eat, she may change her 
decision preferring a steak with French fries. Hence, her preferences of salad (“health”) over 
steak (“pleasure”) have changed, which is not consistent with the classical theory of 
discounted utility (FREDERICK et al., 2002). Such forms of behaviour where the discount rate 
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depends on the time span between the evaluated event and the present are commonly 
termed “hyperbolic discounting” (LAIBSON, 1997, p.445).  
CUTLER et al. (2003) argue that lower time costs of food preparation have an especially 
disastrous effect on people who show such hyperbolic discounting behaviour. While those 
persons derive immediate gratification from the consumption of food, the effects on health 
and body weight from eating too much will occur later. Reduced time costs of food 
preparation affects those individuals the most who possess so called hyperbolic discount 
rates, i.e. those who have self-control problems and overrate immediate pleasure 
irrationally. This has important implications for welfare assessment. The welfare of rational 
consumers increases, when prices fall. However, for people with hyperbolic discounting, the 
welfare effect may be negative when the following relation holds true:  
(10) FWHS CCW  )(  . 
Here, S  and H are the standard and hyperbolic discount rates, W is the change in 
weight, WC are the costs of weight and FC is the change in food costs (CUTLER et al., 2003). 
Equation (11) expresses the welfare effects in time units: 
(11) FWHS TT   )(  ,  
where WT and FT are the time costs of losing the weight gained and the reduction in time 
costs of food preparation, respectively. If people act rationally, the first term becomes zero, 
the condition is not met and welfare increases (despite rising weights). Individuals with 
hyperbolic discount rates underestimate the weight change and its associated costs and put 
on more weight than rational persons would have done (CUTLER et al., 2003).  
IKEDA et al. (2010) analyse the relationship between differences in time discounting and the 
BMI for a large Japanese household survey. Besides pure impatience (higher and lower 
discount rates), they also test for significant effects of hyperbolic discounting as well as for 
an asymmetric discounting behaviour (i.e. benefits are discounted more heavily than costs). 
Again, their data are cross-sectional and the analysis only explains the distribution at one 
point in time (if at all) and not the trends that have occurred. Moreover, discount rates stem 
from experiments using money values. 
SCHARFF (2009) also examines hyperbolic discounting as a “possible reason for the 
persistence” of obesity. He highlights that certain situational influences (e.g. smoking 
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colleagues at work who offer cigarettes or vending machines that sell donuts at work) may 
raise or lower the effective discount rate. Likewise, he argues (following CUTLER et al., 2003) 
that reductions in consumption time costs have “increased the effective discount rate of 
time preference used in food consumption decisions by hyperbolic agents” (p.8)3. SCHARFF 
also runs cross-sectional regressions of proxy variables on calorie intake stratified by body 
weight and gender and finds “that obese dieters display behaviour consistent with 
hyperbolic discounting”. However, the proxies do not seem to really express the pure time 
preference. COURTEMANCHE et al. (2011) examine hyperbolic discounting, too. Their results 
suggest that obesity levels are partly due to rational intertemporal tradeoffs but also partly 
to time inconsistency. 
RICHARDS and HAMILTON (2012) collect data on individual discount schedules for different 
amounts of money in an experimental setting. They conduct econometric tests for time-
consistent behaviour of their respondents and for heterogeneous behaviour with respect to 
patterns of risky behaviour. Their results indicate “that discount functions are quasi-
hyperbolic in shape, and that obesity and drinking are positively related to the discount rate” 
(p.181).  
ETILÉ (2011) concludes that individuals who show hyperbolic discounting “do not receive in 
the long run the utility they would have received if they were to have been consistent” 
(p.729). Hence, the presence of hyperbolic discounting is said to justify interventions that 
help people overcome their self-control problems (BRUNELLO et al., 2009; SASSI, 2010; ETILÉ, 
2011). One means to do so is a “sin tax” suggested by O’DONOGHUE and RABIN (2006). 
However, ETILÉ also warns to be “cautious, however, in labeling behaviors as ‘irrational’” 
(p.728) and states that “absent good measures of time preferences in a large-scale food 
survey, hyperbolic discounting models are not yet testable.” Also CUTLER and GLAESER (2005) 
argue that time preferences provide no consistent explanation for health behaviour. Time in-
consistent behaviour as a rationale for policy interventions is also discussed in Section 4.3.  
                                                 
3
 One should be careful with the notion that the rate of time preference has increased, see also FREDERICK et al. 
(2002) for the issue of mixing up time preference, discount rate, discount factors etc. 
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3.4 Rational addiction 
Another branch of the literature utilises the “rational addiction approach” by BECKER and 
MURPHY (1988) to explain why persons stick to harmful behaviours like overeating or alcohol 
and drug abuse over time. BECKER and MURPHY claim that an addiction can be the result of “a 
consistent plan to maximize utility over time” (p.675). Central to their model is the concept 
of “consumption capital” S which can be regarded as a capital stock built by past 
consumption of the addictive good. This addictive stock affects utility directly as well as 
indirectly by altering the marginal utility derived from the addictive good’s current 
consumption C.  
The indirect property ( 0)(2  SCU ) implies under certain conditions a so called 
“adjacent complementarity” between consumption levels at different points in time. 
Adjacent complementarity entails reinforcement, which means increasing current 
consumption of the addictive good increases future consumption of it (BECKER and MURPHY, 
1988).  
The stock’s direct effect on utility is related to the aspect of tolerance which is often 
observed for harmful addictions. Here, “the marginal utility of the addictive stock is negative 
[ 0 SU ]” (CHALOUPKA and WARNER, 2000). Tolerance implies for harmful addictions that 
“higher past consumption lowers the present utility from the same consumption level” 
(BECKER and MURPHY, 1988, p.682). For beneficial addictions (to music, sports etc.), tolerance 
occurs when 0 SU  (CAWLEY and RUHM, 2011).  
The difference to traditional models of habit formation is that BECKER and MURPHY allow for 
forward-looking agents that maximise their lifetime utility (CAWLEY and RUHM, 2011). CAWLEY 
and RUHM point out that rational addicts might freely choose to become addicts because 
they have a high adjacent complementarity.  
BECKER and MURPHY link their theory to overeating and obesity themselves. They point out 
that “people get addicted not only to alcohol, cocaine, and cigarettes but also to work, 
eating, music, television, news…” (pp.675) and later on also claim that their theory can 
explain binge eating and cycles of overeating and dieting. Also CAWLEY (1999) argues that 
people can get addicted to calories from food resulting in obesity.  
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Some empirical applications can be found in literature. RICHARDS et al. (2007) test whether 
rational addiction applies to consumption of macronutrients (fat, proteins, and 
carbohydrates) from snack foods and find “broad support for the rational addiction 
hypothesis” (p.322) with an especially “strong addiction to carbohydrates” (p.309). MILJKOVIC 
et al. (2008) examine whether rational addiction to sugar is a possible cause of rising obesity 
rates. They find that an “increase in future sweet prices leads to increased sugar 
consumption at [the] current period by overweight and obese people” (p.59) which 
contradicts the predictions of the rational addicts hypothesis. Only the results for normal-
weight people are in line with rational addiction behaviour. LIU and LOPEZ (2012) apply the 
rational addiction model to carbonated soft drinks and find “strong evidence” for a rational 
addiction based on significant effects from past and future consumption on current 
consumption. 
3.5 Behavioural economics 
The concepts of neoclassics and household production theory as outlined in Sections 3.1 and 
3.2 assume that individuals always behave rationally and are fully aware of any factors that 
influence their decision processes. However, experimental studies from psychology and 
behavioural economics have shown that people often deviate from the behaviours we would 
expect from standard economic agents and make “choices that are demonstrably 
suboptimal” (JUST, 2011, p.99).  
Several authors have pointed out such deviations from rational behaviour also occurring in 
the context of food consumption and obesity. A first aspect outlined is different modes of 
decision making where heuristics or simple rules are applied rather than complex, well-
calculated optimisation processes. A second focus is on the influence of situational factors 
that affect the mode of decision making, the value of a decision’s outcome as well as the 
monitoring of achieving the objective (WANSINK et al., 2009; JUST, 2011). The basic ideas will 
be briefly sketched on the following pages which are mainly based on JUST (2011) and 
WANSINK (2004) who provide more detailed reviews of behavioural (economics) aspects of 
food consumption. 
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Decision mode 
The amount of cognitive resources available to a person at the moment he or she is making a 
decision is crucial for what that person’s decision process looks like. In his Cognitive-
Experiential Self Theory (CEST), EPSTEIN (1993) argues that people switch between modes of 
decision depending on those cognitive resources. When sufficient resources and time are 
available to individuals they evaluate stimuli via cognitive processes characterised by 
deliberative and rational thinking. Otherwise, people rely on an experiential system leading 
to faster decisions based on affect or emotion (JUST, 2011). Hence, individuals who are 
exposed to stress or face a number of other decisions at the same time are likely to show 
more impulsive behaviour. Then, their food decisions are not in accordance with their long-
term objectives (e.g. concerning weight or health). 
A second framework by LOEWENSTEIN (2004) highlights the impact of visceral factors like 
hunger or nervousness on time-inconsistent behaviour. While CEST assumes that people 
switch between modes of decision making, the visceral factors approach throughout regards 
humans as thinking rationally. However, the stronger the influence of visceral factors like 
hunger or thirst, the higher the utility that individuals get from the consumption of certain 
foods (JUST et al., 2007). Two propositions of LOEWENSTEIN’s framework seem especially 
vicious. On the one hand, “people underestimate the effect of visceral factors on their own 
behavior”, on the other hand, they “will forget the effect visceral factors played” after some 
time (JUST, 2011, p.105). 
Also prospect theory (KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY, 1979) and mental accounting (THALER, 1980) 
have been used to explain food consumption decisions. These theories consider the findings 
that people relate their possible outcomes to a reference point and show a larger disutility 
from losses than utility from (equal-value) gains related to that reference point. Food 
marketers or policy makers could alter consumption behaviour by setting appropriate 
default options (JUST, 2011). However, defaults may be more or less successful as is shown 
by JUST and PRICE (2013). They examine the effect on consumption in cases where the 
standard offer of school lunches included vegetables and also in cases where not. Results 
indicated that “requiring a fruit or vegetable as part of the school lunch may increase waste 
substantially while only modestly increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables” (ibid., 
p.7).  
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JUST and WANSINK (2011) provide evidence that the behaviour of individuals in flat-rate price 
service contexts, also known as ‘all-you-can-eat’, is strongly related to the concept of 
transaction utility (i.e. “making a good deal”). The authors found that people who were 
randomly assigned to pay a higher price for the buffet consumed 38.6 % more pizza than 
those who had to pay lower prices. As the costs for eating are fixed and paid in advance, 
people should stop eating in both settings when their marginal utility of consumption is zero. 
However, the group with higher prices seemed to eat more to get their money’s worth, as 
long as a positive ‘transaction utility’ from lowering the average cost per slice of pizza 
exceeds the negative utility from overeating and feeling full and uncomfortable. This kind of 
behaviour seems to suffer from the well-known sunk cost fallacy (JUST and WANSINK, 2011).4 
A further result of this study was that the quality of the food provided had an influence in 
flat-rate settings. When less tasty pizza was served, consumption increased, i.e. people ate 
more to justify the fixed price.  
Impact of eating and food environment 
When individuals switch between more cognitive and more affective or emotional modes of 
decision making, heuristics and reference points are of great importance. Then, 
environmental factors can considerably affect food choices. WANSINK and SOBAL (2007) argue 
that external factors can trigger in overserving and overeating when influencing 
consumption norms (i.e. what people think is the right amount to eat) and consumption 
monitoring (i.e. “how much they believe they eat” (ibid., p.109)). Typically, people are not 
aware that they are influenced in such ways, even when they are told (JUST, 2011). 
Environmental influences on food intakes can be categorised into the eating environment 
(e.g. atmosphere, lightning, effort to obtain the food, social interactions, secondary activities 
like TV and reading, other distractions) and the food environment (e.g. salience, structure, 
package or portion size, way of serving) (WANSINK and SOBAL, 2007; JUST, 2011). 
Critics of the psychological or behavioural economical approach observe that the findings 
derived from controlled experiments in a closed setting may not be externally valid. 
MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) address the example of increased portion sizes which are claimed to 
set higher reference points and lead to overeating (YOUNG and NESTLE, 2002). However, 
                                                 
4
 Interestingly, this kind of behaviour has already been described by the old Franconian saying: “Lieber’n Bauch 
verrenkt, als ‘em Wirt was g’schenkt”. 
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CUTLER et al. (2003) report a decrease in average calorie intake per meal that contradicts the 
small-scale findings on the macro level. Other findings from behavioural economics, though, 
might be better in line with the observational data. For instance, CUTLER et al. (2003) found 
that increased snacking is mainly responsible for larger calorie intakes. This would fit with 
the theory that the ubiquitous viewing of delicious food triggers impulsive eating behaviour. 
ANDERSON and MATSA (2011) analysed how the distance to fast-food outlets affects the BMI 
based on large-scale survey data. Controlling for possible reverse causality by using 
proximity to interstate highways as instrument, they found no significant effect on body 
weight.  
4 Cases for policy interventions 
The negative consequences of obesity for individuals and society have raised calls for 
political interventions to halt and reverse the rise in obesity (e.g. WHO, 2004; BROWNELL and 
FRIEDEN, 2009; POPKIN, 2009). Economists writing on this issue are mostly reluctant to support 
such measures without reservation even when they reduce obesity significantly. In the 
absence of market failures, most economists are convinced that the behaviour of rational 
and informed individuals acting on free markets maximises individual utility as well as social 
welfare (CAWLEY, 2011). Governments should not become active until a market failure is 
identified (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007). Even a high prevalence of obesity and its doubtlessly 
severe monetary and psychological consequences are not sufficient in their own right to 
justify interventions (KUCHLER and GOLAN, 2004).  
As seen in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the neoclassical and household production models of 
consumer behaviour explicitly include the possibility that a high proportion of overweight 
and obese people exists within a population. Rational and informed agents weigh the 
immediate as well as all future benefits and costs of their actions to reach the maximum 
achievable utility. “In such a setup, food-related chronic diseases are only private health 
problems and, a priori, the market will be efficient at supplying health inputs, be they junk 
foods or diets” (ETILÉ, 2011, p.727). Hence, when no market failures exist, any intervention 
by governments would draw the market result away from the socially optimal equilibrium.  
However, if there is a market failure, “the equilibrium prices and quantities do not capture 
the total social costs and benefits” (MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009) and the government can improve 
the outcome. To be feasible, though, any intervention needs to pass a second criterion: Its 
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benefits have to outweigh its costs (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007). Thereby, the success of 
political interventions is not evaluated according to the reduction of obesity, but “by how 
well they fix the market failure they were designed to repair” (CAWLEY, 2011, p.133).  
The economic literature concerned with obesity has identified some possible causes of 
market failure which will be reviewed and discussed in the following. 
4.1 Externalities 
A market failure often referred to in the context of obesity is the existence of externalities. 
Externalities occur when economic agents do not include the full costs or benefits of their 
actions into their decisions and deviate from the behaviour they would have shown had they 
taken all consequences into account. Inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and 
suboptimal social welfare will be the result (BRUNELLO et al., 2009; MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009). In 
particular, literature pays attention to two possible external effects, one related to health 
insurance and the other to labour markets (SASSI, 2010).  
Central to the case of insurances are the medical costs that obesity and its co-morbidities 
impose on health care systems. The literature that attempts to estimate the costs of obesity 
for health care systems as well society in total has grown steadily over the last one and a half 
decades. Recent reviews of studies are provided by MÜLLER-RIEMENSCHNEIDER et al. (2008), VON 
LENGERKE and KRAUTH (2011), and WITHROW and ALTER (2011).  
MÜLLER-RIEMENSCHNEIDER et al. (2008) conclude that “obesity appears to be responsible for a 
substantial economic burden in many European countries” (p.499) that ranges from 0.09-
0.61 % of the respective countries’ gross domestic product. WITHROW and ALTER’s (2011) 
review of English language articles finds estimated shares of obesity in a country’s total 
healthcare expenditures of 0.7-2.8 %. The authors report further that the relationship 
between the degree of obesity and health costs is non-linear with morbidly obese people 
(BMI ≥ 40 kg/m²) causing particularly high costs. For the case of Germany, VON LENGERKE et al. 
(2006) found that severely obese persons of classes II and III (BMI > 35) induce average 
annual costs of 2,572 €. These numbers are significantly higher than those for normal-weight 
(847 €), overweight (830 €) and moderately obese persons of class I (30 ≤ BMI < 35) with 
1,080 €. 
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VON LENGERKE and KRAUTH (2011) stress that costs of obesity differ among groups of various 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Their review also includes one study that 
takes a lifetime approach and finds lower lifetime costs of obese people due to lower life 
expectancy and lesser need for long-term care (RAPPANGE et al., 2009). All reviews note the 
considerable heterogeneity in the methodology to estimate the costs of obesity and call for 
increased standardisation to improve the comparability across studies and countries.  
Table 2: Estimates of annual total and direct costs of obesity for different countries. 
Authors Country Year Cost estimates Share in Health Care 
Expenditures 
KATZMARZYK and JANSSEN (2004) Canada 2001 
4.3 bn $ (total costs) 
1.6 bn $ (direct costs) 
2.2 % of total health care 
costs 
EMERY et al. (2007) France 2002 2.1-6.2 bn € (total) 
1.5-4.6 % of total health 
care costs 
KNOLL (2010) Germany 2003/04 
12.8-13.0 bn € (total) 
11.4 bn € (direct) 
n/a 
SANDER and BERGEMANN (2003) Germany 2001 
2.7-5.7 bn € (total) 
1.3-2.7 bn € (direct) 
0.6-1.2 % of total health 
care costs 
MCCORMICK, STONE and CAT 
(2007) 
England 2002 
3.3-3.7 bn £ (total) 
0.9-1.1 bn £ (direct) 
 
2.3-2.6 % of total health 
care costs 
WOLF and COLDITZ (1998) USA 1995 
99.2 bn $ (total) 
51.6 bn $ (direct) 
5.7 % of total health care 
costs 
FINKELSTEIN et al. (2003) USA 1998 78.5 bn $ (total) 
6.5 % of total health care 
costs  
FINKELSTEIN et al. (2009) USA 2008 147 bn $ (total) 
9.1 % of total health care 
costs 
Source: Own composition. 
Table 2 summarises important results for selected studies on the annual total and direct 
costs of obesity. The term “direct costs” refers to the treatment of obesity and its 
attributable shares of associated co-morbidities like type-II diabetes, cardiovascular diseases 
arthrosis, cancer, hypertension, and psychosocial complications. Direct costs estimates 
typically include costs of hospitalisation and surgical interventions, medication, and visits to 
doctors. Total costs are the sum of direct costs and indirect costs. Indirect costs account for 
losses in value added caused by absence from work, morbidity and premature mortality (see 
e.g. KNOLL, 2010). 
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Most health care systems in developed countries are publicly funded and do not require the 
premium a person pays to be differentiated according to her weight. In a case of differing 
risks and corresponding costs in the population but equal premiums for individuals, a 
“positive subsidy for some individuals and a negative subsidy for others” emerges (BRUNELLO 
et al., 2009, p.572). However, the existence of such an insurance subsidy is only a necessary 
condition. Only when the subsidy induces a change in behaviour, i.e. there is a so- called ex 
ante moral hazard problem, is it suitable to speak of an insurance externality (BRUNELLO et al., 
2009; ETILÉ, 2011). BRUNELLO et al. (2009) describe a scenario where body weight is 
determined during childhood and remains more or less fix during adulthood. Here, the 
characteristics of the health care systems would have no influence on efficiency but rather 
on equity.  
The empirical evidence indicates that a possible health externality is rather small. 
BHATTACHARYA and SOOD (2007) also emphasise that both the subsidy to obese individuals and 
the sensitivity of body weight to this subsidy are relevant for the size of the welfare loss in 
the case of pooled insurance. They “estimate that the welfare loss due to the obesity 
externality in the US is about $ 150 per capita (in 1998 dollars)” and stress that “this 
estimate [..] is much smaller than the difference in medical expenditures between the obese 
and non-obese that is typically found in the literature” (p.281). Likewise, BRUNELLO et al. 
(2009) conclude that the obesity externality is likely to be small. However, their assessment 
is based on a simple comparison between the US and Europe with a lower degree of pooling 
but higher obesity rates in the former against a higher degree of pooling but lower obesity 
rates in the latter. 
Apart from examining whether there actually is an insurance externality many authors 
discuss the question of the adequate policy reaction. “The generally accepted rule for 
achieving an optimal social outcome in the face of negative externality is to tax the 
damaging activity at a rate equal to the marginal external cost at the optimal level of 
provision” (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007, p.175). However, there is much controversy about the 
appropriate tax. Taxing unhealthy foods would be questionable, because of the difficulties to 
determine the marginal damage of one unit of “unhealthy” food, which may be zero for 
many consumers (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007). Other suggestions like taxing body weight (or 
adjusting insurance premiums according to weight) (ETILÉ, 2011) or taxing overall dietary 
composition (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007) would be similarly questionable. Such scenarios 
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would disregard the fact that the impact of the BMI on health can be very heterogeneous 
and also the effect of physical activity that plays a great role in determining health would not 
be considered.  
A second branch of possible externalities of obesity is concerned with possible negative 
effects of a high BMI on employment, wages or schooling outcomes. ETILÉ (2011) emphasises 
that the empirical evidence on such relationships “may not reflect a causal effect” (p.725). 
Other factors (genetic and non-genetic) are most likely to affect labour market outcomes 
and obesity at the same time.  
To sum up, externalities with respect to the health system may exist to a certain degree. 
However, their magnitude is most likely considerably lower than portrayed in the public 
discussion and the media. Another question in this respect is whether rising medical costs of 
obesity result from growing obesity prevalence or from the use of increasingly costly 
therapies to treat obesity and its related diseases. 
4.2 Lack of information 
Another market imperfection possibly arises from insufficiently informed consumers. The 
assumption of the standard model on buyers that “understand all their options and they 
understand the consequences of their actions” (MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009, p.68) may then no 
longer hold. The literature discusses four areas where individuals possibly lack information: 
1) people are not aware of the health consequences that emerge from obesity, 2) it is 
unclear how lifestyles (eating and physical activity) affect body weight, 3) information on the 
characteristics of purchased foods such as calorie content and other ingredients is lacking, 4) 
the subjective perception of the healthiness of one’s own weight differs from objective 
medical classifications (MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009; BRUNELLO et al., 2009). 
The existence and the degree of these information problems are highly controversial. SASSI 
(2010) notes that “many would argue that most individuals today possess the basic 
knowledge required for them to broadly discriminate between more and less healthy 
options” (p.125). Also KUCHLER and GOLAN (2004) find it “difficult to believe that many 
Americans are not conscious of the relationship between a healthful diet and obesity” (p.42). 
They support their argument by referring to the omnipresence of diet and health topics in 
the media, government information programs, nutrition labels, and product health claims. 
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Empirical evidence is provided by BRUNELLO et al. (2009) based on data from the 
EUROBAROMETER survey. They find that in most European countries more than 80 % of the 
population knows that high body weight may have a deteriorating effect on health. 
Moreover, they find little evidence in favour of the argument that the information that 
reaches consumers is “fragmented or even conflicting” (CASH and LACANILAO, 2007, p.175). On 
average, less than 9 % of European adults feel that they lack information to follow a healthy 
diet (BRUNELLO et al., 2009).  
VARIYAM and BLAYLOCK (1998) report that the majority of US citizens have basic nutrition 
knowledge. VARIYAM (2008) examines how the introduction of the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act (NLEA) in 1990 affected nutritional behaviour in the US. He finds an increasing 
effect on iron and fibre intakes but no changes in total fat, saturated fatty acids and 
cholesterol intakes. VARIYAM and CAWLEY (2006) present estimates that suggest a decreasing 
effect of the NLEA on obesity among white females by 2.36 %. There is some evidence that 
people fail to correctly evaluate their body weight as healthy or unhealthy (BRUNELLO et al., 
2009). Moreover, KUCHLER and VARIYAM (2002) emphasise that information on food sold at 
restaurants and fast-food outlets may be insufficient. They call for targeted information to 
population subgroups that also takes into account the perceptions of people about their 
own weight status. SEIDERS and PETTY (2004) provide a more detailed overview of many points 
of criticism regarding marketing and information practices for food.  
MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) point out that “suppliers of healthy foods have incentives to provide 
verifiable information on the positive characteristics of their products” (p.71). The means of 
signalling healthy attributes enables them to differentiate their products. 
4.3 Irrational behavior 
A third important rationale for governments to intervene is lack of rationality in human 
beings. There are some areas where economists assume that individuals do not act fully 
rationally, such as in the presence of inconsistent time preferences or susceptibility to 
environmental cues. ETILÉ (2011) deems it “wise to be cautious, however, in labeling 
behaviors as ‘irrational’” (p.728) and CAWLEY (2011) points out that “irrationality is in the eye 
of the beholder” (p.132). 
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Some authors like CAWLEY (2011) advance the view that “society may trust adults to 
accurately weigh the costs and benefits of a high-calorie diet or a sedentary lifestyle” 
(p.132). Paternalistic interventions may be justified though in the case of children who are 
“unable to take into account the future consequences of their actions” (CAWLEY, 2004, 
p.122). 
However, many authors also regard time-inconsistent behaviour as an argument in favour of 
political intervention since “people overeat, despite substantial evidence that they want to 
lose weight” (CUTLER et al., 2003, p.112). Empirical support to this view is given by BRUNELLO 
et al. (2009) who find that a high proportion of adolescents fail in their attempts to lose 
weight. The economic theory behind time-inconsistency assumes quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting as the causal factor behind such behaviour. In that case, discount rates for 
events are lower, the further they are in the future (see Section 3.3). “People who suffer 
from lack of self-control do not make a rational choice which maximizes their overall lifetime 
welfare” and “their utility can be increased by their not being allowed to indulge in short-
sighted behavior” (MAZZOCCHI et al., 2009, p.65). O’DONOGHUE and RABIN (2006) show that “sin 
taxes” may support people to stick to their long-term plans. Moreover, if individuals suffer 
from physical or psychological addiction, there clearly is a role for government (MAZZOCCHI et 
al., 2009). 
Another area where non-rational behaviour is assumed is the case of environmental cues 
like the view or smell of tasty food that “trigger uncontrollable shifts in preferences” (ETILÉ, 
2011, p.730). Hence, “cue-based strategies that firms use to encourage consumers’ 
purchases have negative externalities: They lead to overconsumption and favour addiction” 
(ibid., p.730). 
GLAESER (2006) perceives policies aimed at self-control problems as questionable because 
“paternalistic interventions always involve trading off the welfare of people at one point in 
time with people at some other point in time, and this requires tricky social welfare 
decisions. Second, the first-best response to self-control problems is always to increase the 
availability of technologies or contracts that facilitate private self control, which cannot 
really be called paternalism because these policies increase, rather than decrease, the choice 
set” (p.136). 
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4.4 Other welfare considerations 
In addition to the three classical rationales described above, the literature discusses further 
reasons for government intervention such as opposition to the food industry and equity 
issues. 
KUCHLER and GOLAN (2004) raise the question whether “producers are not responsive to 
consumer demand and do not supply the types of food desired by consumers” (p.41). They 
doubt, however, that “a business strategy that disregards consumer preferences could 
succeed for long” and conclude that the “wide variety of food products on grocery store 
shelves reflects the willingness and ability of the industry to adapt to consumer preferences” 
(p.41). They list multiple examples like the provision of ‘low-carb’ or ‘low-fat’ products, the 
existence of over 40.000 food products available and the multiple outlets that provide 
almost any food type one could think of. Also CAWLEY (2004) claims that it is the natural 
objective of the food industry to produce and sell “the goods or services that yield the 
highest profit. […] To the extent that consumers want to be more physically active, eat 
healthier foods, and weigh less, private industry has a profit incentive to help them do it” 
(p.123). 
Based on the observation that obesity is more prevalent among groups of lower 
socioeconomic status, many authors see “a strong basis for intervention on equity grounds” 
(BRUNELLO et al., 2009, p.552). Obesity is associated with unemployment, low income, poor 
education or social isolation and “it is of particular concern to some governments that 
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups and ethnic minorities appear to take up less healthy 
lifestyles in increasing proportions, and they appear to be less responsive than other groups 
to interventions aimed at improving lifestyles” (SASSI, 2010, p.155). Whether socioeconomic 
status affects BMI or vice versa or whether both are simultaneously affected by underlying 
factors is difficult to determine (BRUNELLO et al., 2009; ETILÉ, 2011). With regard to 
socioeconomic differences, obesity would be one objective that would be tackled together 
with many others by a general policy that would enhance the opportunities of 
disadvantaged social groups. Specific inequities pointed out by CAWLEY (2004) are the 
existence of food deserts (grocery stores in African-American neighbourhoods sell less low-
fat products or fruits and vegetables) or the lack of safe environments for physical activities 
in poor inner city neighbourhoods compared to wealthier suburbs. Further concerns related 
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to equity issues are possible regressive effects of fiscal measures to reduce obesity rates 
(ETILÉ, 2011). These will be discussed in Section 5.  
5 Potential of fiscal measures to reduce obesity  
While Section 4 deals with the question whether governments should intervene to reduce 
obesity, the present section discusses whether they actually can do something about it. 
Thereby, a clear focus lies on fiscal measures to alter relative market prices, since most of 
the other papers in this dissertation are concerned with price issues. 
The initial proposal of price measures came from public health experts. Taxes on energy-rich 
foods or foods high in fat or sugar were supposed to reduce consumption of more 
“unhealthy” food items while subsidies on fruits and vegetables, for instance, would favour 
higher intakes of more “healthy” produce (BROWNELL, 1994; BATTLE and BROWNELL, 1997). 
However, only very high taxes could possibly reach such outcomes what lead some authors 
to doubt their political “feasibility and desirability” (JACOBSON and BROWNELL, 2000, p.854). 
Therefore, small taxes that do not necessarily change consumption behaviour but generate 
substantial revenues were regarded as an alternative. For example, JACOBSON and BROWNELL 
(2000, p.857) “suggest that public health professionals consider recommending snack taxes 
[on soft drinks, candy, gum, and snack foods] as a means of funding healthy eating and 
physical activity programs”. According to their estimates, a national tax in the US of 1 cent 
per 12 ounces of soft drink would generate $ 1.5 billion per year. 
The early debate on food taxes naturally drew the attention of (agricultural) economists and 
initiated an ever growing number of studies that investigated the relationship between food 
prices, consumption patterns, and body weight as well as possible outcomes of fiscal 
measures to promote healthier lifestyles.  
5.1 Empirical evidence 
There are already several reviews of empirical studies that assess relations between food 
prices and obesity and their implications for taxes and subsidies (POWELL and CHALOUPKA, 
2009; POWELL et al., 2013; FAULKNER et al., 2011; POWELL and CHRIQUI, 2011; ANDREYEVA et al., 
2010; THOW et al., 2010). Thus, the plan here is not to provide another review but present 
the essence of the research results. This leaves room to put more emphasis on 
methodological issues and policy implications.  
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5.1.1 Price-BMI relationships 
One stream of the literature analyses reduced-form relationships between prices of selected 
food products and BMI and, respectively, the probability of being obese. POWELL et al. (2013) 
conclude that “overall, the evidence on the extent to which changes in food and beverage 
prices may significantly impact weight outcomes remains mixed” (p.122). Although some 
studies find significant price effects on body weight, the received elasticities are mostly 
smaller than 0.1 in absolute values.  
The study of CHOU et al. (2004) finds an elasticity of BMI with respect to prices in fast-food 
restaurants of -0.05 and to food-at-home prices of -0.04. Moreover, they find that the 
prevalence of obesity falls by 0.6-0.7 percentage points when (any) food prices rise by 10 %. 
POWELL (2009) finds a similar fast-food price elasticity of BMI of -0.08 for adolescents. POWELL 
and BAO (2009) report price-weight elasticities for adolescents for fruit and vegetable prices 
of 0.07 (total population) and 0.14 (low-income households) as well as for fast-food prices of 
-0.26 (but only for low-income households). Estimations by subgroups suggest significantly 
higher elasticities of -0.31 for teenage children in middle-income households. Results of 
STURM and DATAR (2005; 2008) indicate that a difference of one standard deviation in prices 
for fruits and vegetables between two areas would cause a 0.11 points higher BMI in 
children by the third grade and a 0.2 points higher BMI by the fifth grade. HAN and POWELL 
(2011) found no significant effect of food prices on the prevalence of obesity among young 
women. They do report a significantly negative effect of fast-food prices on obesity for 
young men in a random-effects model that could not be confirmed, however, in a fixed-
effects specification. HAN et al. (2012) found some unexpected positive coefficients of fast-
food prices with respect to weight.  
FLETCHER et al. (2010a; 2010b) analyse the effects of state-level soft drink taxes on BMI and 
find statistically significant coefficients. Their magnitude is however small: Increasing the tax 
rate by one percentage point lowers the BMI by 0.003 kg/m² and decreases the prevalence 
of obesity and overweight by 0.01 and 0.02 percentage points, respectively. SCHROETER and 
LUSK (2008) report a positive elasticity of food-at-home prices with respect to weight of 0.1, 
indicating that a decrease in the price of food at home would also decrease weight. 
However, the food-at-home-price elasticity with respect to BMI is negative, which is 
inconsistent. The conclusion that can be drawn from those studies is that there may be 
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significant effects of food prices on BMI. Of course, this is what one would expect, when 
acknowledging that prices have an impact on food consumption and food consumption, in 
turn, has an impact on body weight. However, the magnitude of the price effect on weight is 
very small due to many other variables and substitutive relationships. 
5.1.2 Demand systems 
According to ETILÉ (2011), studies that just examine price-weight outcomes “cannot, 
hOwever, inform the construction of price policies because they do not consider the whole 
pattern of substitution between products” (p.731). One could argue, of course, that all those 
substitution processes finally culminate in body weight. Hence, such analyses can inform 
policy makers to a certain degree. What they cannot achieve, however, is to provide a 
picture of the expectable consumption patterns after a policy change and their impact on 
budgets and nutrient patterns that have important implications for welfare and health 
aspects. To answer such questions, demand-system analyses are the preferable means 
because they give explicit information on own- and cross-price effects and substitutive 
relationships (ETILÉ, 2011). 
Studies that examine effects of food taxes and subsidies via demand systems indeed reveal 
important insights into possible shifts regarding nutrient intakes. ALLAIS et al. (2009) estimate 
a complete demand system using scanner data for French households. Based on the 
resulting price elasticities they compute nutrient elasticities to assess the effect of price 
changes on nutrient intakes. They simulate higher value-added-taxes on 
cheese/butter/cream, sugar-fat-products, and/or prepared meals and conclude that “a fat-
tax policy is unsuitable for substantially affecting the nutrients purchased by French 
households and leads to ambiguous effects” (p.243) such as lower intakes of important 
nutrients as several vitamins and minerals nutrients (ALLAIS et al., 2009). A further result is 
that such a fat tax would generate substantial revenues, but is also highly regressive. 
CHOUINARD et al. (2007) examine likely effects of taxing the percentage of fat in food items 
and estimate a demand system for dairy products. They find that a 10 %-tax on fat content 
would reduce fat consumption by less than 1 %. The estimates of CHOUINARD et al. mark such 
a fat tax as extremely regressive with higher welfare losses for elderly and poor people.  
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NORDSTRÖM and THUNSTRÖM (2011) analyse the effects of targeted food taxes and subsidies 
“aimed at redirecting grain consumption to healthier levels” (p.267). Based on previous 
demand-system results they simulate revenue-neutral policy reforms for several population 
subgroups. Results indicate that, regarding tax payments, such reforms are progressive. The 
authors point out, however, that policies directed at other food groups may have different 
welfare effects. With respect to health effects, the authors find that it is the highest income 
group that benefits the most from the proposed reforms by increasing their fibre 
consumption by 38 %. At the same time, “the increase in fibre intake is accompanied by 
substantial increases in the intake of the unhealthy nutrients, though, making the net health 
effects difficult to evaluate” (p.9). This example mirrors an often pronounced view that 
policies aimed at altering the consumption of one target nutrient (e.g. saturated fats) or 
energy may have negative effects on intakes of other nutrients.  
KUCHLER et al. (2005) estimate single demand equations for snack foods like chips and other 
salty snacks to assess likely effects of a tax on these food items. Their estimates suggest that 
taxes would have only minor effects on dietary quality but would generate large revenues.  
In the course of the debate about food taxes, many researchers especially in the US 
identified soft drinks as a promising target for taxes. They are perceived as the single largest 
contributor to energy intake with low nutritional value (BROWNELL et al., 2009). Literature 
reports quite high own-price elasticities of around 0.8-1.0 in absolute values that promise 
substantial reductions in consumption when taxes raise prices (ANDREYEVA et al., 2010). 
However, other studies point out that possible shifts to energy-rich substitutes compensate 
for the decrease in soft-drink consumptions. FLETCHER et al. (2010b) show that there are 
possible counterintuitive effects of sin taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages. Analysing the 
effects of soft-drink taxes on child and adolescent soft drink consumption, they find that 
“moderate reductions in soft drink consumption from current soda tax rates” are 
“completely offset by increases in calories from other beverages” (p.968) mainly whole 
milk.5 FLETCHER (2011) adds that although soda taxation may not be able to achieve its 
primary goal, i.e. reduction of obesity, it can have positive side effects on health through 
more nutritious substitutes. Juices and milk, for instance, contain comparable levels of 
energy but are in addition sources of valuable vitamins and minerals. 
                                                 
5
 The large effect of whole milk is quite surprising at first. However, these results were obtained for a sample of 
children and adolescents, where substitution of soft drinks by milk is surely more likely than in the case of adults.  
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SMITH et al. (2010) employ household scanner data to estimate a demand system for eight 
beverage categories. The received elasticities were applied to actual individual intake data to 
simulate energy-intake and body-weight effects of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages 
(SSB). They found that a 20 % tax on SSB would reduce net daily energy intake from all 
beverages by 37 kcal for adults and 43 kcal for children. Translated into body weight these 
changes would result in a loss of 3.8 pounds and 4.5 pounds, respectively. The authors 
conclude that there is a certain potential of taxes on SSB to reduce the prevalence of obesity 
and overweight in the US. However, they also point out that much of the effect depends on 
the reactions of manufacturers and retailers and how much they allow the tax to be fully 
passed forward to consumers. From a methodological point of view the elasticities received 
from household scanner data should be treated with care. Since beverages often are subject 
to price promotions, received elasticities are likely to mirror short-term purchasing 
behaviour and, thus, are higher in absolute values than long-term elasticities.  
Table 3: Mean estimates of own-price elasticities of demand for selected beverages, fast food, and fruits and 
vegetables, 2007-2012 
Food and beverage category Mean price elasticity 
estimate 
Range No. of estimates 
(a) Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs and soft drink beverages) 
SSBs overall -1.21 -0.71 to -3-87 12 
SSBs -1.08 -0.87 to -1.26 3 
Regular carbonated soft drinks -1.25 -0.71 to -2.26 4 
Sports drinks -2.44 -1.01 to -3.87 2 
Fruit drinks -1.41 -0.69 to -1.91 3 
Soft drinks -0.86 -0.41 to -1.86 4 
(b) Fast food 
Fast food -0.52 -0.47 to -0.57 2 
(c) Fruits and vegetables 
Fruits -0.49 -0.26 to -0.81 4 
Vegetables -0.48 -0.26 to -0.72 4 
Source: POWELL et al. (2013, p.117). 
POWELL et al. (2013) provide a compilation of estimated own-price elasticities from studies 
that are related to food taxes to reduce obesity (see Table 3). Although the mean values are 
quite high, especially for beverages, the size of the estimated coefficients varies strongly. 
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5.1.3 The role of substitution effects 
SCHROETER et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion of substitution effects that can occur 
when certain food items are taxed. They derive theoretical conditions that have to be 
fulfilled, when a tax or a subsidy should have a weight-reducing effect. Starting from a 
simple utility function that includes weight W, a high-calorie food product FH, a low-calorie 
food product FL, physical exercise E, and other consumption goods, where weight depends 
on FH, FL, and E, they arrive at equation (12): 
(12) HHHL
H
L
pFpF
WF
WF 


 . 
Equation (12) needs to be fulfilled when a tax should reduce body weight. HWF and LWF are 
the elasticities of weight W with respect to the intakes of FH and FL, respectively, HLpF is the 
cross-price elasticity of FL with respect to the price of FH and HHpF is the own-price elasticity 
of FH. The ratio of the weight elasticities is by definition smaller than one. SCHROETER et al. 
(2008) now discuss the relationships between those products: When FL and FH are 
complements, the cross-price elasticity is smaller than one and weight will decrease. When 
FL and FH are substitutes the outcome is less clear and depends on the relative energy 
content of the two food items. The condition in eq. (12) holds, when the energy content of 
FH substantially exceeds that of FL and HL WFWF  reaches zero. However, when both food 
products have quite similar energy contents, the ratio approaches unity. Additionally, when
HHHL pFpF
  , eq. (12) is no longer fulfilled and weight will increase. Analogous conditions 
can be derived for income, exercise and for the case of multiple products.  
Using food-price elasticities from literature and calculating food-weight elasticities via 
energy accounting, SCHROETER et al. (2008) simulate different tax scenarios. They find a 
weight-reducing effect of soft-drink taxes, a smaller weight-decreasing effect of subsidies on 
diet soft drinks and weight-increasing effects of taxes on food consumed away from home 
and subsidies on food eaten at home.  
The studies presented so far have assessed probable welfare effects of food price 
interventions only with respect to the changes of consumption and expenditure and classical 
welfare calculations. They found that taxes are highly regressive because individuals of lower 
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socioeconomic status consume relatively more of the products in question and experience 
higher welfare losses when these products are taxed. However, some authors argue that 
these groups are also likely to enjoy the highest health benefits from weight reduction as a 
result of an intervention. 
LUSK and SCHROETER (2012) propose a simple way to explicitly include the weight loss into a 
welfare analysis and examine the net welfare effect of a food price measure. Their analysis 
builds on the model in SCHROETER et al. (2008) where weight is explicitly included in the utility 
function. They use the indirect utility function to model the welfare effect of a tax t on the 
basis of an individual consumer’s equivalent variation EV and arrive at equation (13): 
(13) 
















H
WHH
p
W
WTPFtpEV
*
* . 
The welfare effect of a fat tax is expressed by means of the equivalent variation, the amount 
of money that must be given to or taken from the consumer to keep him on the same utility 
level as before the tax. The tax would increase his welfare when EV is negative and decrease 
his welfare when EV is positive. The welfare-decreasing effect would be higher the higher 
the tax t and the consumption level of the taxed food FH* are. A welfare-increasing effect 
arises from the inclusion of weight: HpW  *  measures the weight change resulting from an 
increase in the price of high-calorie food and is smaller than zero, and WTPW is the 
individual’s willingness to pay to reduce weight by one pound. Hence, the consumer benefits 
from a tax, when EV < 0 or  HWH pWWTPF  ** .  
Based on actual consumption data and the price-weight elasticities calculated in SCHROETER et 
al. (2008), LUSK and SCHROETER (2012) estimate how large a person’s willingness to pay for 
weight reduction should be to realise a welfare gain from a fat tax. The most optimistic 
scenario suggests that an individual should be willing to pay $760 per pound weight lost to 
benefit from a tax. This amount is far higher in comparison to empirical values for WTP to 
lose weight that range around $13/lb to $33/lb (NARBO and SJÖSTRÖM, 2000; CAWLEY, 2004). 
The effect of taxes on consumption and weight are likely to depend on food culture and the 
perception of what the relevant substitutes for consumers are. While in Europe the closest 
substitute to sugary soft drinks may be diet soft drinks, water or juice spritzer, consumers in 
the US will shift to sweetened milk drinks or gallons of juice. 
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5.1.4 Divided opinions about the implications of the empirical results 
At this juncture the economic profession is divided whether fiscal measures significantly 
affect body weight and obesity prevalence. A poll of the IGM Economic Experts Panel among 
“distinguished experts with a keen interest in public policy from the major areas of 
economics” (IGM, 2013) revealed that a slight majority agrees to the statement: “Taxes or 
bans on large bottles of soft drinks containing sugar are not likely to have a significant effect 
on obesity rates because people will substitute towards consuming excessive calories in 
other ways“. The explicit results are shown in Figure 10.  
FAULKNER et al. (2011) conducted a Delphi survey among leading researchers in the field of 
obesity economics. These experts were asked to evaluate different policy measures 
according to several outcomes such as impact on consumption, physical activity, obesity, 
cost-effectiveness, unintended consequences, equity issues and political feasibility. The 
results of this Delphi survey are shown in Table 4. 
Figure 10: Results of IGM economic expert panel on soft drinks taxes 
 
 
 
Note: Responses (in %) to the statement „Taxes or bans on large bottles of soft drinks containing sugar are not likely to have a significant 
effect on obesity rates because people will substitute towards consuming excessive calories in other ways”. 
 
Source: IGM (2013). 
The participants evaluated the effectiveness of most interventions as “low” to “moderate”. 
FAULKNER et al. (2011) report that three-quarters of the panel supported the introduction of a 
tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. This judgement seems to be based less on the moderate 
impacts on consumption or obesity but rather on the possible “powerful impact over time “, 
where the tax functions as a signal for other “tax, legislative, and educational initiatives to 
address obesity” (p.8) where certain food items are stigmatised. As these expectations are 
not really based on sound scientific evidence, the conclusions drawn by FAULKNER et al. 
(2011) are highly questionable:  
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“Overall, the evidence is not sufficiently strong to provide clear policy direction. Additionally, 
the nature of the experiments needed to provide definitive evidence supporting certain policy 
directions is likely to be complex and potentially unfeasible. However, these are no reasons 
to take no action. It is likely that policies need to be implemented in the face of an 
incomplete evidence base” (ibid., p.1). 
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Table 4: Results of a delphi survey on likely effects of intervention to reduce obesity 
Source: FAULKNER et al. (2011). 
 Impact on 
consumption 
Impact on 
PA 
Impact on 
obesity 
Cost-
effective 
Unintended 
benefit 
Unintended 
harm 
Equitable Politically 
feasible 
Intervention Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD Mean IQD 
Beverage tax 2.9 0   2.1 0 2.9 0.5 2.5 1 2.4 1 2.3 1 2.5 1 
Food tax 2.7 1   2.2 0.5 2.8 0.5 2.4 1 2.8 1 1.9 0 2.1 0 
Fruits & Vegetables subsidies 2.9 0   2.1 0 2.3 1 2.9 0 2.1 1.5 2.5 1 2.5 1 
Child fitness tax credit   2.3 1 2.1 0.5 2.1 0.5 2.8 0.5 2.0 0 2.1 1 3.2 1 
Adult fitness tax credit   2.3 1 1.8 0 2.0 0 2.5 1 2.0 0 2.0 0.5 2.9 0.5 
Public transit tax credit   2.1 0 2.0 0 2.2 0 3.1 0.5 1.9 0.5 2.7 1 3.2 1 
Sporting equipment tax credit   1.9 0 1.7 1 1.7 1 2.3 0.5 1.9 0 2.1 0 2.6 1 
Subsidised PA programs   2.5 1 2.0 0 2.1 0 2.6 1 2.1 0 2.3 0 2.5 1 
Road congestion tax   2.1 0 1.7 1 2.5 1 3.4 1 1.9 0 2.4 1 2.3 1 
Income transfer unrestricted 2.0 1.5 1.7 1 1.9 1 1.8 1.5 2.9 0.5 2.7 1 2.0 1.5 2.5 1 
Income transfer healthy food 2.9 0.5   2.1 0 2.6 1 2.8 0.5 2.3 0.5 2.4 1 2.8 0.5 
Income transfer PA   2.3 1 1.9 0 1.9 0 2.5 1 2.0 0 2.3 1 2.2 1 
Agricultural subsidies 2.4 1   2.3 0.5 2.9 0.5 2.9 1.5 2.6 1 2.1 1 1.7 1 
Agricultural R&D rebalance 2.4 1   2.2 0.5 2.5 1 2.9 0.5 2.3 1 2.8 0.5 2.7 1 
Notes: Not at all/None = 1; Low = 2; Moderate = 3; High/A lot =4. 
PA = Physical Activity; IQD = Inter Quartile Deviation; indicates the distance between the 25th and the 75th percentiles. A smaller IQD represents greater 
consensus. 
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5.1.5 Econometric challenges for inference on food price effects 
Since many of the factors influencing and influenced by body weight “are usually not subject 
to experimental manipulation” (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011, p.237), research on 
relationships between economic variables and body weight mainly relies on observational 
data. The attempt to infer causal effects related to obesity and overweight, however, faces 
various challenges regarding estimation methods and data quality (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 
2011). Especially “the exogeneity of food prices is an important identification challenge” 
(LAKDAWALLA and ZHENG, 2011, p.465). 
A main concern is the problem of endogeneity causing bias in the parameters that should 
show the causal effects of one variable on another. Endogeneity exists when the 
independent variables in least-squares regressions are correlated with the error term and 
can have three different sources that most probably exist in many obesity research 
questions. 1) The relation between independent and dependent variable is not 
unidirectional but is rather characterised by reverse causality. 2) Important factors that 
affect the independent variable are not included in the regression equation (unobserved 
heterogeneity, omitted variables). When correlated with an independent variable, the 
coefficients will be biased. 3) Independent variables are measured with error (AULD and 
GROOTENDORST, 2011). 
One example where endogeneity probably plays a role is the relationship between the 
prevalence of obesity in a certain area and the number of fast-food outlets there. Statistics 
show a very similar development of restaurant density and obesity over time, leading 
numerous researchers to establish a causal relationship. However, whether more 
restaurants cause higher obesity rates is questionable (ANDERSON and MATSA, 2011). We could 
as well suppose a reverse causality (people eat fast-food more often when the density of 
outlets is higher and gain weight but fast-food restaurants settle in areas with higher obesity 
prevalence) but also confounding factors like the tendency of obese people and fast-food 
outlets to locate in lower-income areas (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011). Another example 
would be obesity and schooling, where both variables can be assumed to be affected by 
other factors simultaneously (like motivation, abilities, family background, or discipline) 
(AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011). Likewise, “food prices might be higher in areas with higher 
demand for food and during periods with higher demand for food” (LAKDAWALLA and ZHENG, 
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2011, p.465). Moreover, the measurement of food prices can be subject to substantial 
errors, especially, when aggregate food prices are employed (LAKDAWALLA and ZHENG, 2011). 
Possible solutions to these problems are randomized controlled trials, adjustments of 
covariates, the use of instrumental variables and the application of panel data methods. 
However, LAKDAWALLA and ZHENG (2011) point out that all of the different approaches to 
identification “suffer from one or more key weaknesses” (p.466). The gold standard to 
identification are randomized experiments, where the influencing factor (x) can be controlled 
by the researcher independent to any other influencing factor on the dependent variable (y) 
(ANGRIST and PISCHKE, 2009). “Since controlled experiments are frequently costly or infeasible, 
obesity researchers commonly use observational data to infer causation” (AULD and 
GROOTENDORST, 2011, p.240). To reduce omitted-variable bias or confounding, the analyst 
should integrate as many possible variables that affect obesity as possible. However, some 
factors that lead to heterogeneous outcomes simply are not observed or cannot be 
observed. Additionally, “covariate adjustment does not correct for other types of 
endogeneity, i.e. measurement error and reverse causality” (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011, 
p.240). 
A third approach to endogeneity is the use of Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques. Here, 
the researcher employs so-called instruments, one or more variables that affect x, are not 
correlated with the error term and their impact on y is exclusively through their impact on x. 
Thus, the part of the variation in x caused by the instruments is independent from any other 
source and of a “quasi-experimental” nature (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011). However, IV 
estimators are subject to strong reservations either because of weak instruments (they 
explain only little of the variation in x) or because they are correlated with the error term. A 
variable proposed to instrument food prices are relative food taxes (LAKDAWALLA and 
PHILIPSON, 2002) that, however, vary very little over time. Fast food availability is 
instrumented by proximity to interstate highways (ANDERSON and MATSA, 2011). A drawback 
here is the very small effect of interstate location on restaurant utilisation (LAKDAWALLA and 
ZHENG, 2011).  
A fourth and frequently applied tool are panel data models. The use of longitudinal data that 
include several observations for the same individuals or households over time allows at least 
some potential endogeneity source to be avoided. It is assumed that important but usually 
immeasurable determinants on obesity (like culture, discipline, motivation) that are 
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correlated to regressors (like prices, age, and education) are constant over time. Hence, 
estimators considering only the varying factors (like fixed-effects models or differenced 
models) are not subject to this kind of endogeneity. Therefore, “the most common approach 
to identification is to control for area and time fixed-effects in panel data” (LAKDAWALLA and 
ZHENG, 2011, p.465). This allows avoiding endogeneity caused by unobserved regional factors 
(like eating habits, culture tradition, and infrastructure) that affect BMI and are correlated 
with food prices. Possible difficulties could arise when time trends are not homogeneous 
across all areas (LAKDAWALLA and ZHENG, 2011).  
In their review of studies analysing the effect of food prices on BMI, POWELL et al. (2013) 
report that “longitudinal estimation methods” are increasingly used. “Studies that provided 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates revealed that the associations mostly but not 
always remained statistically significant in the longitudinal models. However, the 
longitudinal fixed-effects estimates showed that the cross-sectional estimates often 
overestimated the associations highlighting the importance of controlling for individual-level 
unobserved heterogeneity” (ibid., p.124). 
AULD and GROOTENDORST (2011) stress that most of the regressions that analyse the 
determinants of obesity have very low R² values - usually around 0.1. Many of the commonly 
included socioeconomic and environmental factors apparently explain only little of the total 
variation in body weight. It follows that those variables may be insufficient to influence body 
weight substantially. Moreover, the usefulness of IV techniques is limited in such a case. 
A final challenge to the econometric analysis of obesity is the dynamic formation of body 
weight. From such a perspective, body weight is a stock variable determined by the flow of 
net energy intake/expenditures in the past (AULD and GROOTENDORST, 2011). Measuring all the 
possible economic and non-economic factors as well as incorporating them into a model is 
close to impossible. “An additional challenge in this line of research is that very small 
changes in behaviour can produce large changes in weight over time” (AULD and 
GROOTENDORST, 2011, p.249). 
5.1.6 Issues of policy design  
POWELL and CHRIQUI (2011) discuss in which manner pricing policies should be designed to 
yield the best outcomes. With respect to the size of a tax, the obviously inelastic reactions of 
energy intake and body weight to price changes should be taken into account. High tax rates 
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would be necessary to induce a shift in behaviour that leads to a reduction in body weights. 
When the objective is to raise revenues, smaller taxes should be preferred since they “hold 
tremendous potential” (POWELL and CHRIQUI, 2011) for generating government revenues. This 
widely expressed view is, however, not necessarily consistent with the theory of an optimal 
tax. In the case of an inelastic demand, the revenue maximising tax rate actually may 
substantially reduce consumption and generate very high revenues. One remaining 
argument for small taxes is that they seem to be more feasible from a political perspective 
(e.g. JACOBSON and BROWNELL, 2000). Moreover, the public is more likely to accept such taxes, 
when the revenues are earmarked for other measures, like information campaigns, to 
reduce obesity (e.g. KUCHLER et al., 2005). Governments, however, are usually not obliged to 
exclusively use these revenues for targeted purposes. 
Another issue regarding the design of taxes is finding a suitable tax base. POWELL and CHRIQUI 
(2011) argue that taxing specific groups of food would be easier with respect to legislative 
and administration efforts compared to taxing ingredients or nutrient content of food items. 
Public health experts target especially those food groups with low nutritional value like soft 
drinks (BROWNELL et al., 2009; CARAHER and COWBURN, 2005).  
In contrast, CHOUINARD et al. (2007) compare taxing certain food groups such as soft drinks or 
snack foods to reduce sugar or fat intakes to “taxing electricity consumption – regardless of 
the source – to reduce air pollution” (p.1). Such a tax scheme would cause no substitutions 
away from products with high contents of the unhealthy nutrient to products with lower 
contents within the food groups. They advocate taxes on the proportion of fat or sugar in 
food items, analogous to taxing carbon to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because “such a 
tax would fall unequally on food according to their fat content” (p.1). MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) 
point out that such “taxes on ingredients would trigger various repercussions” (p.139). 
Taxing ingredients rather than food groups would eventually cause food manufacturers to 
reformulate their products, e.g. decreasing the contents of the unhealthy ingredients. 
However, products that contain high levels of substances deemed as unhealthy often 
contain considerable amounts of healthy ones. Examples are dairy products that are rich fat 
and calcium or fruit juices rich in sugar and vitamins.  
According to LEICESTER and WINDMEIJER (2004), taxes on nutritional content will cause high 
monitoring costs and may have unintended effects on other nutrients. High costs of 
administration, for instance, were one of the reasons to remove the fat tax in Denmark (see 
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also the Introduction). PHILIPSON and POSNER (2008) argue that “probably, any feasible tax 
response to obesity would cost more to enforce than it would be worth in reducing the 
social costs of obesity” (p.615). 
US literature further discusses whether fat taxes should be levied on federal or state level. 
From a European perspective the question would be rather whether these apply within 
single countries or within the Union. The case of Denmark has shown for instance that 
people went increasingly shopping for their butter etc. in neighbouring countries, to the 
disadvantage of local producers and retailers.  
Finally policy makers have to consider the appropriate form of the tax, i.e. whether sales or 
excise taxes should be favoured. POWELL and CHRIQUI (2011) argue that excise taxes have 
some advantages over sales taxes: 1) as a part of the shelf price, excise taxes are more 
obvious to consumers; 2) the location of purchase (stores, vending machines, restaurants) 
would not matter in case of an excise tax; 3) if an excise tax was applied, there would be no 
possibility to lower the tax rate per unit of the product compared to possible effects of 
volume discounts on sales taxes (e.g. by selling large containers). BROWNELL et al. (2009) add 
that sales taxes may lead consumers to switch to lower-priced brands. However, different 
views exist whether a higher visibility of a tax would be an advantage or a disadvantage. 
CASH et al. (2008) suggests that the act of taxation not only alters prices but conveys 
additional information and thereby puts a stigma on the taxed products that may trigger 
stronger consumer reaction. 
CASH et al. (2005) emphasise that individuals can follow a healthy diet even if they consume 
snack foods or soft drinks sometimes because they like them. Such persons would be 
penalised by a tax without a reason. A more differentiated tax only on excessive 
consumption of certain foods, for instance, would, however, be impracticable. 
CARAHER and COWBURN (2005) propose to draw the focus of fat taxes away from consumers. 
They argue that taxes and subsidies on raw materials at the manufacturer level may 
encourage the production of healthier food. Additionally, price measures in “closed systems 
such as schools and the workplace” (ibid., p.1242) may be more promising compared to a 
general intervention. BROWNELL et al. (2009) favour a threshold approach for sugar-
sweetened beverages of 1 g of sugar per ounce (30 ml) to “encourage manufacturers to 
reformulate products” (p. 1602).  
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5.1.7 Conditions of successful tax policies 
ALLAIS et al. (2009) expect reactions to taxes from the food industry such as product 
reformulations and discuss two possibilities. On the one hand, producers can lower the 
nutritional quality of their products to keep prices relatively constant. An opposite strategy 
would be to raise the value of the product by adding “more expensive ingredients and/or 
implementing new processes”. The resulting product would be less affordable to low-income 
consumers. Hence, both strategies would decrease nutritional quality among households of 
lower socio-economic levels. Also ETILÉ (2011) points out that an important underlying 
assumption for the simulation of changes in nutrient intakes is that the “nutritional 
composition of products is unaffected by price changes” (p.733). When this condition holds 
true, researchers are able to simulate how prices affect demanded food quantities and, in 
turn, the nutrient intakes as for instance done by BEATTY and LAFRANCE (2005) (ETILÉ, 2011).  
5.2 Discussion about agricultural policies 
Some authors from the public health field have blamed the agricultural production system as 
well as agricultural policies for contributing to the obesity epidemic. In the US, for instance, 
POLLAN (2003) points out that “while one hand of the federal government is campaigning 
against the epidemic of obesity, the other hand is actually subsidizing it, by writing farmers a 
check for every bushel of corn they can grow” (p.2). Additionally, the race of farmers to 
increase yields and output by innovations in agricultural technology in order to hold up 
revenues in times of decreasing prices was a “sure-fire recipe for overproduction“ (p.2). For 
the case of the EU, SCHÄFER ELINDER (2005) argues that it is “important to tackle the 
oversupply of food, driven by agricultural subsidies” (p.1333) provided by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). To illustrate her arguments, she gives 
two examples from the milk sector where “production levels at 20 % above the domestic 
demand” are maintained, “at prices twice as high as on the world market” (p.1334). Some of 
the surplus milk is “sold with subsidies to the food industry, which turns it mainly into ice 
cream and cakes” another is used for the school milk program. The first case would result in 
additional 1.5 kg of butter per person and year; the second translates into 1.5 kg saturated 
fats per child and year, so the calculations of SCHÄFER ELINDER (2005).6  
                                                 
6
 This calculation, however, does not consider likely compensatory effects, e.g. drinking less milk at home. 
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Naturally, these reproaches have prompted agricultural economists to analyse the likely 
effects of agricultural policies on food prices and (over)consumption in more detail. 
ALSTON et al. (2008) acknowledge the possibility that “farm subsidies contribute to lower 
relative prices and increased consumption of fattening foods by making certain farm 
commodities more abundant and therefore cheaper” (p.472). For this to happen, however, 
they formulate three preconditions that must be met: 1) subsidies must significantly 
decrease the prices of farm commodities that serve as inputs to “fattening” foods, 2) a 
decrease in the prices of those inputs must translate to lower prices of the final food 
products at the retail level, 3) lower prices of the end products must significantly increase 
the consumption of these foods.  
The effect of subsidies on commodity prices is regarded as rather small. Prices of some 
commodities like food and feed grains (used for the production of cereals, pasta, bread or 
livestock) experienced a decreasing effect by subsidies. However, an increase in production 
and consumption has been restricted by “additional policies that restricted acreage or 
production” (ALSTON et al., 2008, p.472). Other commodities like sugar, dairy products, and 
orange juice are subject to import restrictions that increase the price and reduce 
consumption (ALSTON et al., 2008). Several authors have estimated the effects of eliminating 
US farm programs and conclude that commodity prices, except for corn and wheat, would 
decrease and, in turn, would trigger higher consumption (MCDONALD et al., 2006). Larger 
effects could be expected from eliminating subsidies for subsectors like crops or corn 
(ALSTON, 2007; SUMNER, 2005). 
Examining the special case of sweetener crops, BEGHIN and JENSEN (2008) conclude that “the 
current link between US sweetener consumption and farm policy is weak” (p.480). Mainly 
the low farm value share in sweetened foods is responsible for the low influence of policies 
targeted at the farm sector on the final retail products. The situation may have been 
different in earlier times and especially public expenditures on research and development 
have substantially lowered the price of corn and feed costs in the production of meat, 
poultry and dairy products. Likewise, High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) is obtained from corn 
which constitutes an input for most soft drinks and sweets. 
In response to SCHÄFER ELINDER and others, SCHMIDHUBER and SHETTY (2010) asses how 
Europeans’ diets have changed and what contribution the Common Agricultural Policy made 
to this change. From the 1960s to the 2000s energy supply increased and also the share of 
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lipids in diet increased. The share of sugar remained nearly constant, with declines in the 
North and rising intakes in the South. However, it is remarkable that simple carbohydrates 
like added sugar and refined flour “have not significantly replaced in large measures foods 
rich in complex carbohydrates” (p.133). The intake of refined carbohydrates is substantially 
higher in other countries, first and foremost the US (more than twice as much) but also 
Egypt, Lebanon and other countries in the Near East (SCHMIDHUBER and SHETTY, 2010).  
The availability of fruits and vegetables is far more than the recommended 400 g per day 
and person though real intakes are much lower. The authors report that the CAP has 
“significantly raised primary food prices” (p.144), in particular of sugar, milk and dairy 
products, and meat. Thus, especially the “bad” nutrients like saturated fats, cholesterol and 
sugar have been taxed. High margins and low rates of vertical price transmission hindered a 
significant impact of the CAP on final consumer prices. “If anything, the main instruments of 
the CAP should even have curbed food consumption, rather than stimulated it, notably of 
saturated fats and sugar” (p.145). SCHMIDHUBER and SHETTY conclude that the CAP has not 
been and would not be an efficient tool for changing food consumption and point to other 
more relevant factors like increases in income and the availability of food, female labour-
force participation and growing food-away-from-home (FAFH) consumption. However, the 
authors concede that the CAP may have substantially affected consumption patterns in 
countries outside the EU. Especially in the region of the Near East and North Africa, export 
subsidies and resulting lower prices combined with lower margins to the final product “may 
have stimulated over-consumption, and contributed to the region’s growing overweight and 
obesity problem” (p.145). 
The key piece in the empirical evidence is the share of farm products in the total production 
costs of food at the retail level. On average this share is about 20 % (ALSTON et al., 2008) and 
much lower for highly processed foods that are prominently blamed for overweight and 
obesity. According to BEGHIN and JENSEN (2008), the share of HFCS amounts to only 1.6 % of 
the value of soft drink sales. Hence, even large price changes at the farm-gate level would 
result in negligible changes in food prices faced by consumers. MILLER and COBLE (2007) 
compared direct payments to producers and total food expenditures of consumers. Between 
1960 and 2003 the subsidies were on average 1.1 % of consumer expenditures implying a 
very low effect on consumption decisions. 
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While the impact of farm policies/programs on the change in food consumption patterns 
seems to be limited, public investments in research and development probably played a 
more important role (ALSTON et al., 2008; BEGHIN and JENSEN, 2008). ALSTON et al. provide 
figures according to which food prices have decreased substantially since the 1950s (for 
livestock by 54 %, field crops by 72 %, vegetables by 28 % and fruits and nuts by 23 %). They 
conclude that “these price changes are sufficient to have had meaningful impacts on the 
cost of food and the prices paid by consumers for food products” (p.477). A reversal of the 
technological change would increase the price of final food products by 20 %, which would 
trigger a significant demand response.  
RICKARD et al. (2013) simulate effects of US agricultural policies on calorie intake based on a 
comprehensive model that takes into account both the market for primary commodities as 
well as for processed food products. They conduct their simulations for three different time 
periods as well as for different commodity categories. RICKARD et al. (2013) find that “holding 
all other policies constant - removing US subsidies on grains and oilseeds in the three periods 
would have caused caloric consumption to decrease minimally whereas removal of all US 
agricultural policies (including barriers against imports of sugar and dairy products) would 
have caused total caloric intake to increase” (p.316). Moreover, they report a decreasing 
policy impact on energy in the course of time that approaches zero. 
BONNET and REQUILLART (2011) analyse how the EU sugar policy reform affects the 
consumption of sugar. Using the example of the soft drink market, they estimate that sugar 
prices will fall by 36 % which reduces soft drink prices by 3 %. These lower prices would 
cause higher soft drink consumption and an additional sugar intake of 124 g per person per 
year.  
6 Some open questions  
This paper provided a comprehensive review of the economic literature on obesity. It 
showed that economic research addresses many important and relevant aspects concerning 
our view of consumer behaviour, uses innovative econometric techniques to analyse 
behaviour related to health and nutrition and contributes to the public discussion on policies 
to halt and reduce the increasing prevalence of obesity worldwide. This review also 
revealed, however, that the case of obesity is very complex and that many research 
questions remain open. 
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First of all, heterogeneity plays an eminent role. The descriptive statistics in Section 2 clearly 
show large gradients of obesity prevalence based on age, sex, income, education and other 
socio-economic characteristics. The development of the BMI distribution further indicates 
that some groups are especially vulnerable to changed environments. Consequently, we 
would expect considerable variation in consumer behaviour such as different reactions to 
prices. Moreover, studies that analyse such behaviour urgently need to consider 
heterogeneity in order to facilitate targeted policy-making.  
A second aspect that the existing literature neglects is a consideration of food quality. 
Theoretical discussions about effects of fat taxes or thin subsidies exclusively focus on the 
substitution of one product (group), for instance meat, by another, let’s say vegetables. In 
the presence of increasing product differentiation and supply of various quality levels, 
however, it might well be that taxing a certain product results in consumers still buying that 
product but at a lower price and quality level.  
A third challenge for analysing interrelationships between body weight or other health 
indicators and economic determinants concerns econometric methodology and adequate 
data. The discussion in Section 5.1.5 stressed that fixed-effects estimation methods based 
on longitudinal data is an important and widely used tool to control for other variables that 
are omitted or unobservable. It is also necessary to have access to exogenous and detailed 
price data.  
A final aspect is the theoretical treatment of human behaviour related to health and 
nutrition. Here, the emphasis on the trade-offs between different utility-generating 
objectives subject to budget or other constraints is very appealing (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
This is exactly the core of decisions that human beings face every day. However, many 
papers that use those theoretical concepts, especially of household production theory, 
neglected or deliberately leave out important aspects in order to get a smooth and simple 
theoretical model. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Distribution of BMI in England, 1986-2005 
 
Data for 1986 refer to Britain and for 1991-2005 to England. 
Source: MAZZOCCHI et al. (2009) based on data from the DNS Britain (1986/7) and from Health Survey of 
England. 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of BMI in the Russian Federation, 1994-2005 
 
Source: Own presentation from RLMS data, 1994-2005. 
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